DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION
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ABSTRACT
The relationship between corruption and human rights is only
beginning to be seriously examined. A major premise of the
ongoing research argues that corruption disables a state from
meeting its obligations to respect, fulfill, and protect the human
rights of its citizens.
This Article explores two other relationships between human
rights and corruption. First, it shows how individualistic and
procedural rights have been used to defeat investigations and
prosecutions of corruption by high-level governmental officials.
Second, it demonstrates how anti-corruption reforms are
inconsistent with the social and economic rights of the poor and
marginalized because they have primarily targeted the promotion
of market efficiency while reducing spending on basic needs and
rights such as health and education. These findings are significant
because they show that the relationship between corruption and
human rights extends beyond demonstrating that corruption
disables states from meeting their human rights obligations.
Indeed, human rights can be used in support of or against
corruption.
The thrust of the recommendations made in this Article are
premised on an approach to human rights that offers the
maximum potential for the democratization of the Kenyan State
through transformative constitutional and institutional reforms.
This can be done by expanding human rights concerns to include
minority rights and safeguards as well as social and economic
rights of the poor and marginalized as central agendas.
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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between corruption and economic
performance is now well understood. However, the relationship
between human rights and corruption is much less understood and
is only beginning to be seriously researched.1 This research project
contributes to ongoing efforts to understand the relationship
between corruption and human rights in the Kenyan context.
Corruption affects human rights in a variety of ways. For
example, the rights to food, water, education, health, and the
ability to seek justice can be violated if a bribe is required to gain
access to these basic rights.2 Corruption by high-level government
officials can siphon millions of dollars of the country’s wealth,
which in turn handicaps the government from fulfilling its duty to
protect, ensure, and respect the rights guaranteed to its people.
This relationship between human rights and corruption is
ambiguous however; while corruption negatively affects human
rights protection, human rights can help corruption to flourish.3
This is because human rights and procedural rights, such as due
process—the right not to have undue delay in court proceedings,
and the right to a fair trial—can be used by corrupt government
officials to circumvent and avoid punishment and accountability
for the role they played in acquiring personal gain for themselves
at the expense of the people they should be serving.
1 See generally Julio Bacio Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights
(Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, 2008) (discussing the
growing social implications of corruption and its connection to human rights
violations), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/150/131_terracino
_en_2008.pdf; Carlos Castresana, Prosecution of Corruption Cases and Respect of
Human Rights, ¶ 1 (Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, July 27,
2007) (stating the International Council on Human Rights Policy’s desire to
further explore the relationship between human rights and corruption), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/123/131_-_Carlos_Castresana_-_2007.pdf;
Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the
Connection 1 (Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, 2009)
(discussing the increasing international efforts to address corruption and the
challenges that exist in combating it), available at http://www.Ichrp.org/files
/reports/40/131_web.pdf; Transparency Int’l, Human Rights and Corruption 2–3
(Transparency Int’l, Working Paper No. 05, 2008), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/working_papers/wp
_2008_0_23_human_rights _corruption [hereinafter Corruption and Human Rights]
(examining the common links in ideology and goals between human rights and
international anti-corruption regimes).
2 See Terracino, supra note 1 (examining the implications which corruption
may have upon access to basic human rights).
3 See infra Section 4.6. (Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption Cases).
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A major reason why the relationship between corruption and
human rights has been less well understood is because the primary
impetus of the anti-corruption agenda came from the World Bank
in light of its mandate in development policy.4 Further, as Section
3 of this Article shows, from the 1960s to the early 1970s,
corruption was a backburner issue in bilateral relations between
developing and developed countries as well as in development
policy. In some circles, corruption was argued to be necessary to
overcome bureaucratic red tape in newly independent countries.
This began to change as the corrupting influence of multinational
corporations became the subject of developing country action
within the United Nations in the mid-1970s. A proposed code of
conduct for multinational corporations reflected these concerns.
However, it was the emergence of the good governance agenda
sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Bank
in particular, at the end of the 1980s that brought corruption to the
center stage of development policy. Since then, corruption has
been seen as a major impediment to the success of economic
reforms.
In Section 3, this Article will discuss at length how human
rights fit into the anti-corruption agenda. Section 3 discusses the
relationship between human rights and corruption not only
conceptually but in the Kenyan context as well. It proceeds from
the premise that high levels of corruption in a society are likely to
disable a state from fulfilling its duties to respect and protect the
human rights of its citizens.5 Section 3 pushes that premise even
further by arguing that human rights abuses among and between
individuals in a society are likely to be higher in a country with
high levels of corruption.
The discussion in Section 3 confirms the foregoing premises
through an extensive and contextual discussion of civil and
political rights, social and economic rights as well as minority
rights in the Kenyan context. For example, this Section discusses
4 In fact, Peter Eigen, the founder of the leading global anti-corruption nongovernmental organization, Transparency International, was a manager of World
Bank Manager programs in Africa and Latin America. Based on his experiences at
the World Bank, he founded Transparency International to promote
accountability and transparency in international development. See Peter Eigen,
Founder and Chair of the Board of Advisor of Transparency International,
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/4651/27528
(listing Peter Eigen’s credentials).
5 See Terracino, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the effects of corruption on the
health care sector in limiting patient access to healthcare).
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the importance of freedom of expression in exposing corruption, as
well as the manner in which the Kenyan government and the
courts have compromised the ability of a free press to report
openly about corruption, particularly when it involves senior
governmental officials. Section 4 also discusses a trio of recent
High Court cases, Ng’eny and Saitoti on the one hand, and
Murungaru on the other. The first two cases show how the
judiciary used the protections of Kenya’s Bill of Rights to shield
government ministers from any prosecutions for engaging in
corruption. The courts in these two cases exhibit how the use of a
merely procedural conception of human rights in the judicial
system fails to confront the power relations that underlie abuse of
public resources characterized by corruption.
While the
Murungaru case somewhat restored hope that the Bill of Rights in
the Kenyan Constitution would not be used to defend corruption
suspects, this Article shows the importance of broadening human
rights to include social and economic rights as well as minority
rights and safeguards in the anti-corruption context. Section 4
shows that such a broad understanding of human rights would
help in significantly changing the way Kenyan law is implicated in
producing corruption. In fact, it demonstrates that it is precisely
the role that law has played so far that has facilitated the kind of
impunity with which every Kenyan government without exception
has engaged in corruption.
While Section 4 shows how the well-heeled have used the Bill
of Rights to protect themselves against investigations and
prosecutions of corruption-related offenses, Section 4.10 shows that
anti-corruption and attendant judicial reforms have been primarily
designed to facilitate market reform rather than to be sensitive to
the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged. This is problematic
especially because it is these groups that stand to suffer most when
their government is corrupt.6 The Article argues that these reforms
have foreclosed addressing questions of inequality and injustice.
As such, the Article argues in favor of an anti-corruption agenda
that is complemented by efforts to address the problems
confronted by the poor and disadvantaged as a central component
of the anti-corruption agenda.

6 See infra Section 4.2. (How Corruption Affects the Poor, Marginalized, and
Disadvantaged).
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Such an approach would approximate what Upendra Baxi has
insightfully called “taking suffering seriously.”7 Under such an
approach,
institutional
and
constitutional
reform
and
transformation of the current political arrangements that have
thrived on corruption would become an integral aspect of the
struggle for the protection and promotion of human rights. Used
effectively, the anti-corruption agenda offers the best opportunity
to transform the struggle for human rights from its primary
preoccupation with civil and political rights to focus on social and
economic rights as well. That is why an effective anti-corruption
agenda must be accompanied by broad-based constitutional
reform to decentralize executive power to make it more
accountable to Parliament, the Judiciary, and the people. This
would in turn require Parliament and the Judiciary to be
independent so that they could act as effective checks against the
Executive. It would also require citizens to be actively involved in
monitoring these institutions to ensure that they were acting
consistently with a vision of the social good rather than the
interests of a select few.8 Finally, it would also require an approach
to anti-corruption reform that is specifically tailored to the
particular country in question and not a generic “one plan works
for every country approach.”9 The final Section of this Article
summarizes these and other recommendations for reform.
7 See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the
Supreme Court of India, in LAW AND POVERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 387 (Upendra Baxi
ed., 1988) (discussing the background and growing prevalence of social action
litigation in India as a medium for traditionally disadvantaged and repressed
groups to seek justice). See also UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6
(2002) (analyzing the varying images of the character of human rights); Upendra
Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129 n.11 (1998) (discussing the practice of discursivity and
its role in creating a civil and political rights regime that is separate and distinct
from the social, cultural, and economics rights regimes); Willy Mutunga,
Relational Contract Theory Outside National Jurisdictions (1992) (unpublished
thesis, on file with Osgoode Hall Law School) (proposing a jurisprudence of basic
needs for all people).
8 See WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL
SOCIETY AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA, 1992–1997, 216 (1999) (examining the
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change in the context of the community’s
role in affecting political and constitutional reform in Kenya).
9 See C. Raj Kumar, Corruption Development and Good Governance: Challenges for
Promoting Access to Justice in Asia, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 475, 509 (2008), for a
discussion on the significance of considering the importance of both national and
local variations in cultural, economical, and political factors when considering
human rights. See also C. Raj Kumar, Corruption, Human Rights, and Development:
Sovereignty and State Capacity to Good Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 416,
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THE ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM AGENDA: ITS GENESIS IN
DEVELOPMENT POLICY

2.1. Introduction
The contemporary consensus on the necessity of anticorruption initiatives in development policy may be taken for
granted. It may, for example, be presumed that anti-corruption
initiatives were and have always been a central tenet of the
prevailing national and international economic development
agenda. This Article argues that this claim is far from true. Three
specific arguments are made in the Article to show that the
contemporary
consensus
on
anti-corruption
initiatives
demonstrates a remarkable departure from prior attitudes towards
corruption. The first claim is that bribery of foreign government
officials has been transformed from being regarded as a necessary
cost of doing business. This virtuous view of bribery prevailed
especially among some economists in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Today, bribery of foreign government officials is almost
universally condemned as an economic cost that retards economic
growth and development. Second, this Article argues that the
concerns of developing countries within the United Nations system
of organizations in the 1960s and 1970s to enact a code of conduct
for multinational corporations that would have prevented them
from bribing government officials in their countries has largely but
not entirely shifted to focus on government officials who take
bribes. The third claim in this Article is that as the anti-corruption
initiatives have become central to national, regional, and

418 (2005) (examining criticism levied against western countries and NGO’s such
as the World Bank grounded in charges that their proposals are almost always the
same without any special consideration given to the specifics of each country,
different human rights values of that country, or to whether alternative measures
would be more effective); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy, and
Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495, 503 (1999)
(discussing the problems that have arisen in countries such as Cambodia when
the idea of using development to combat corruption has been put into practice);
World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29 – Apr. 2, 1993, Report of the Regional
Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993) (“[W]hile human rights are universal in
nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process
of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds.”).
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international cooperation on development, there has been less
attention paid to corruption within the private sector.
The Article is divided into three parts. Section 3 examines the
period between 1960 and 1980.
It examines three distinct
influences that kept corruption at bay as a critical development
policy issue. First, it examines the influence of developed states in
the 1960s at a moment of hope for newly independent countries
and the hesitation, based on concepts of cultural relativism, in
raising the issue of corruption even as it began to become endemic
in many developing countries towards the end of the 1960s. The
second influence that the Article traces is that of economists of the
period who regarded corruption as a necessary cost of doing
business in highly regulated countries. A third influence came
from the work done in comparative politics which claimed that
corruption was an indicator of a necessary path towards economic
and political development much like in the developed world. In
Section 4, the Article examines the early origins of anti-corruption
initiatives in the efforts of developing countries to curb
multinational corporation bribery within the U.N. Section 4 also
examines the efforts of developed countries to come up with a code
of conduct for multinational corporations in the OECD and the
United State’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. This Section
then proceeds to examine the World Bank’s good governance
initiative as the first major reflection of an emerging international
consensus on addressing corruption in developing countries,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, in Section 5, the author
examines the modern anti-corruption consensus by examining
various international and regional initiatives at the intergovernmental and non-governmental level. In particular, I focus
on the manner in which anti-corruption initiatives are heading
towards linking human rights and constitutionalism as part and
parcel of the anti-corruption campaign.
2.2. Setting the Stage for the Emergence of the Anti-Corruption
Consensus: 1960-1980
2.2.1.

Corruption as a Back-Burner Issue in Bilateral Relations:
The Cultural Relativist View

In the 1960s and in the 1970s, corruption within African states
was often ignored by development economics, western bilateral
and multilateral donors, and those studying Africa in the West.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

132

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:1

Yet, towards the end of the 1960s, it was clear that widespread
corruption was accompanied by an emerging trend of
authoritarian, one-party and military rule, economic decline, and
general political instability in many sub-Saharan African
countries.10 One of the reasons that accounts for this lack of open
acknowledgement of corruption, particularly among Africa’s
bilateral development partners and Westerners studying Africa,
was that in the immediate post-colonial period many were wary of
openly criticizing the fledgling governments. As the Africanist
L.H. Gann, along with Peter Duignan, lamented regarding the
1960s, “[w]e were alone in predicting that newly independent
Africa might have to cope with military coups, corruption, ethnic
strife, and other afflictions. The great majority of Africanists,
particularly in the United States, did not wish to criticize the new
countries, lest they be regarded as racists.”11 According to Gann
and Duignan, this conciliatory attitude was to give Africans a
chance and space to develop without criticism from the West.12
This was also an era characterized by optimism that Africa would
develop much like the West without question.13 Hence, Samuel
Huntington argued:
In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a
society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy
is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy. A
10 See ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK
AFRICA: PRINCE, AUTOCRAT, PROPHET, TYRANT 17–18 (1982) (“During the past two
decades, scholars, journalists, and other observers of African affairs have noted
the recurrence of such phenomena as ‘coups’, ‘plots’, clientelism,’ [and]
‘corruption’ . . . in numerous African countries . . . . However, as yet there has
been little inclination to view such phenomena as integral elements of a distinctive
political system; they are more likely to be seen as merely the defects of an
otherwise well-established public order.”) (emphasis original). See e.g. Roberta E.
McKown, Domestic Correlates of Military Intervention in African Politics, 3 J. POL. &
MIL. SOC. 191 (1975) (examining the significance of the military coup d’état in
Africa and its impact on international politics); Amos Perlmutter, The Praetorian
State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in
Developing Polities, 1 COMP. POL. 382 (1969) (analyzing the social and political
factors that contribute to the rise of modern praetorian states, where the military
has the potential to dominate the nation’s political system).
11 L.H. Gann, Ex Africa: An Africanist’s Intellectual Autobiography, 31 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 477, 487 (1993).
12 Id.
13 See Colin Leys, Confronting the African Tragedy, 204 NEW LEFT REV. 33, 33
(1994) (noting that the “history of the previous ninety years—i.e., since 1870—
seemed to justify optimism.”).
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society which is relatively uncorrupt—a traditional society
for instance where traditional norms are still powerful —
may find a certain amount of corruption a welcome
lubricant easing the path to modernization.14
Consequently, there was less criticism of corruption in this
early period than perhaps there should have been. Indeed, it is fair
to say that two of the countervailing approaches to studying
African politics and economics at the time—modernization theory
and dependency theory—similarly avoided corruption issues,
perhaps in order to put a good face on the African State.
According to Colin Leys:
[T]hese . . . schools of thought tended either to have an
ahistorical approach, or unrealistically short-term
perspectives. Modernizers were largely uninterested in
history of any kind, and imagined Africa catching up with
the west in a generation or two, helped by the advantage of
having
western
technology
available
to
them.
Dependentistas—at least in some cases—imagined some
kind of alternative path of ‘autocentric’ development,
following “delinking”; and some Marxists imagined Cuban
or Chinese-style revolutions. Few theorists of any these
persuasions expected the post-colonial states of all
ideological stripes to be corrupt, rapacious, inefficient and
unstable, as they have almost all been. Most saw these
things as aberrations, distortions and pathologies, and often
tended to resort to single-factor or reductionist explanations
of them. And their hopes have only too deeply
disappointed.15
There is still another reason for the reluctance of Africa’s
bilateral partners today to confront directly the messy politics and
economic decline of post-colonial rule—The Cold War.16 For the
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968).
Leys, supra note 13 at 41. See also James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance
Narratives on Africa’s Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuities and
Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971,
997–1007 (2000) (examining corruption as a limiting force on developmental
economics of the African state and the modern nationalist view on reforming
economic and political policies).
16 See MWALIMU MATI & JOHN GITHONGO, JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST CORRUPTION IN KENYA 5 (2001), reprinted in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
14
15
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United States, countries that rejected communism no matter how
corrupt and dictatorial were considered allies. For the Soviet
Union, those countries that embraced communist or approaches to
governance that rejected the type of market-based approaches
promoted by the United States were regarded as allies no matter
their record on political and economic performance. For both the
United States and the Soviet Union, democracy and measures such
as those involved in combating corruption were not as central to
their foreign policy priorities as were their ideological goals.17
2.2.2.

Corruption as a Necessary Cost of Business – The ‘Virtuous
Bribery Story’18

Another factor that contributed to underplaying corruption in
the 1960s and 1970s was a debate among economists regarding the
desirability of corruption. Economists such as Nathaniel Neff
argued that it was possible for corruption to be beneficial for
According to this school of thought,
economic growth.19
developing country governments had developed pervasive and
inefficient regulations. Corruption, then, would help circumvent
these regulations at a low cost because it would reduce uncertainty
- KENYA: CONTRIBUTION TO THE RULE OF LAW REPORT 2001 OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS KENYA SECTION 4 (2001), available at http://www.tikenya
.org/documents/JudicialDecisions.doc (citing how the politics of the Cold War
meant that many regimes perceived as thoroughly corrupt—like Kenya’s—
nevertheless did not find their legitimacy challenged seriously as a result of
corruption).
17 See WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S.
INTERVENTIONISM AND HEGEMONY 318–19 (1996) (arguing that behind the façade of
supporting dictatorships to promoting “democratic” regimes, U.S. policy upholds
the undemocratic status quo of Third World countries).
18 See Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease,
Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? 24 (World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper
No.
2048,
1999),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=604923 (“While one may
think of examples in which some firms/people are made better off either by
paying a bribe or the opportunity to pay a bribe, the overall effect of corruption on
economic development is negative.”).
19 See Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic
Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 8–14 (1964) (discussing economic efficiency
virtues of corruption); see also James Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms:
Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption
Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 407, 425–26 (1999) (discussing how various
ant-corruption initiatives that form part of the rule of law reforms that donors
require of public officials in Kenya do not necessarily do not necessarily guarantee
or entail fair or substantive outcomes).
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over enforcement. Hence, while the corrupt officials get bribed,
allocative efficiency is improved since the official would reward
the contract at stake to the lowest cost bidder.
Other scholars argued that corruption was necessary to speed
up the bureaucratic process or to mediate between political parties
that could not otherwise reach agreement. On this view, the bribe
giver would be better off if the payment of the bribe would result
in reducing the time that would otherwise have been wasted going
through circuitous bureaucratic tussles without end.20 This strand
of research thus stands for the proposition that bribes are virtuous
since they reduce the deadweight cost of regulatory interventions
by directing scarce resources toward higher bidders.21
However, it is equally plausible that corrupt officials may delay
rather than speed up the administrative process to get more
bribes.22 According to Shang-Jin Wei, the best claim that can be
made to this virtuous bribery story is a very narrow one.23 Citing
prior studies Shang-Jin Wei argues that even when bad regulation
and official harassment are taken as exogenous, more time is spent
negotiating with government officials.24
Consequently, he
concludes that on average, it is more likely that bribery leaves
society and those paying bribes worse-off in general. Moreover,
given that a briber may not be fully informed on the bribing
capacity of competitors, in considering to offer a bribe, it may turn

20 See Francis T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL. ECON.
760, 760–762 (1985) (discussing how bribery can lead to socially optimal
solutions).
21 Id.
22 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, 2 ASIAN DRAMA 951–952 (1968) (suggesting a possible
perverse relationship between bureaucratic regulations and bribery); see also Anne
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 291
(1974) (arguing that competitive rent-seeking, including bribery, brings additional
costs to the table). See generally PETER BAUER, A DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT (1976)
(departing from the virtuous story of bribery).
23 See generally Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, Does ‘Grease Money’ Speed
Up the Wheels of Commerce (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
W7093,
1999),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org
/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/grease.pdf (suggesting that bureaucratic
harassment may be endogenous, and that “firms that pay more bribes are also
likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating
regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital”).
24 Id.
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out under certain conditions that the lowest-cost firm could still
win the contract thereby leaving the bribe payer worse off.25
2.2.3.

Corruption as a Necessary Path to Development –
Comparative Politics

Studies in comparative politics further buttressed the view that
corruption was not as economically inimical to growth and
development in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the most famous of
these was Samuel Huntington’s 1968 book, Political Order in
Changing Societies.26 In that well-known book, Huntington argued
that:
Just as the corruption produced by the expansion of
political participation helps integrate new groups into the
political system, so also the corruption produced by the
expansion of governmental regulation may help stimulate
economic development. Corruption may be one way of
surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations
which hamper economic expansion.27
For Huntington, corruption was as important for purposes of
national integration as it was for stimulating economic
development. He predicated his hope on the false optimism of the
future of newly independent countries becoming developed as a
matter of course. This optimism was buoyed by the fact that the
United States had experienced speedy growth as a result of similar
corruption in the 1870s and 1880s particularly at the state level
with the emerging giant railroad and utility corporations.28 Other
leading scholars such as Joseph S. Nye29 supported this view,
25 See Paul J. Beck & Michael W. Maher, A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in
Thin Markets, 20 ECON. LETTERS 1, 5 (1986) (concluding that “there is a fundamental
isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the
transaction”); see also Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, A Note on Competitive Bribery Games,
22 ECON. LETTERS 337 (1986) (“Within a competitive bribery game in which each
player has incomplete information, we show that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium which is symmetric.”).
26 HUNTINGTON, supra note 14.
27 Id. at 68.
28 Id. at 68–69.
29 See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419–20 (1967) (pointing out that there seem to
be at least three ways in which some kinds of corruption can promote economic
development: capital formation, cutting red tape, and entrepreneurship and
incentives); see also C.J. FREDERICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS: VIOLENCE,
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giving it further credibility. Even scholars from a Marxist
orientation overlooked corruption premising their hopes on
Africa’s future less to the history of medieval Europe than to the
‘successful’ economic planning that had turned the Soviet Union
into a great power within a very short period of time.30
However, while corruption may have led to the emergence of
an entrepreneurial class in medieval Europe and in the gilded-age
era of the United States, corruption did not necessarily lead to the
same consequences in sub-Saharan Africa.31 As Pranab Bardhan
argues, in developing countries, corruption feeds upon itself for a
number of reasons: first, it is beneficial for the payee and the payer;
second, it is so entrenched that it becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy;32 and third, once corruption takes root in a society it is
hard to eliminate or win back trust.33 This is a much more nuanced
understanding of the persistence of corruption since it does not
presume that a one-time anti-corruption campaign or a simple
reversal of corrupt behavior will eliminate corruption.34 It does not
also presume that corruption in societies where it is endemic is
there to stay.35 This more nuanced understanding informs the
claim in this Article that anti-corruption measures ought to
combine human rights and constitutionalism with broad public
support in order to be effective.
BETRAYAL, CORRUPTION, SECRECY AND PROPAGANDA 171 (1972) (maintaining that
where corruption can help to adapt an antiquated or obsolete political order to
changing conditions, it can be said to be functional).
30 See James Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance Discourse:
Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD.
65, 81 (1999) (“Other reasons why the newly independent countries in the postWorld War II era rejected free markets as an option included the export
pessimism experienced in developed countries and the success of the Soviet
Union which, through economic planning, despite being a relatively
underdeveloped country, had become a great power in just one generation.”).
31 See Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1320, 1328–29 (1997) (speculating that perhaps South East Asia
is an exception to this phenomenon since it has experienced enormous growth
notwithstanding the presence of corruption); see also ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S
NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 39–40, 72–73 (1989)
(discussing how South Korea dealt with corruption).
32 See John Mulaa, A Sad Case of Kenyans Condoning Corruption, EAST AFRICAN
STANDARD, August 5, 2007, at 26 (discussing how endemic corruption is in the
Kenyan context).
33 Bardhan, supra note 31, at 1330–35.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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THE EMBRYONIC STAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTICORRUPTION CONSENSUS

3.1. Developing Country Focus on Corruption within the United
Nations 1960-1990
The newly independent countries of Asia and Africa combined
with Latin American and other developing countries to form a
solid majority within the United Nations in the post-World War II
era with a view to reforming the international political economy
favourably towards them.36 By such an agenda, these countries
hoped to, among other things, undo what they perceived to be the
unfair concessions entered into by predecessor colonial regimes
and recalibrate rules of trade, finance, and commerce to attain
fairer and advantageous bargains in ways that respected
sovereignty over their natural resources.37
Controlling corrupt payments to officials in these countries by
multinational corporations was a central aspect of these initiatives.
At the end of the 1960s, there was widespread evidence of big
multinational corporations such as I.T.T., Lockheed, United
Brands, Mobil, Exxon, and E.R. Squibb, giving huge bribes in a
variety of countries.38 The thrust of the concerns expressed by
36 See James Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 184,
203–05 (1996) (surveying various scholarly viewpoints on Third World countries’
failed attempt to restructure international relations by establishing an equilibrium
between their raw-material-producing economies and Western industrial serviceoriented economies); see also James Gathii, The Limits of the New International Rule
of Law on Good Governance, in LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 218–31 (Edward Quashigah & Obiora
Okafor eds., 1999) (discussing macro-economic reform in the new international
rule of law as well as the role of public international legal scholarship in defeating
a joint third world agenda and its New International Economic Order proposal).
37 For an early view, see Subhash C. Jain, Legal ‘Dichotomy’ of Concessions, 9
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 512 (1969), where the author distinguishes between preindependence and post-independence concessions and concludes that the former
are voidable due to the fact that the states on which they are imposed did not
actively participate in their adoption. For a later well-known view, see
MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979),
for a discussion on changes in international order and law, such as decolonization
and the deterioration of terms of trade, which precipitated the establishment of a
New International Economic Order.
38 See Peter W. Schroth, Constitutional Aspects of the Proposed African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 7–8 (Feb. 24, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Schroth, Constitutional
Aspects] (noting specific cases of foreign bribery admitted by American
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developing countries hinged on an affirmation of their sovereignty
through the aspiration to control the influence of multinational
corporations within their countries. The extreme manifestation of
this aspiration was prompted by the financial involvement of I.T.T.
in the plot to remove leftist Chilean President Allende and to
replace him with General Pinochet who favoured the interests of
foreign investors such as I.T.T.39
Indeed, the 1976 Declaration of the Heads of States at the 5th
Conference of the Non-Aligned States took issue with
multinational corporate corruption as “motivated by exploitative
profits” and exhausting third world resources while distorting
these economies.40 According to this Declaration, these practices
constituted violations of these countries rights to selfdetermination and non-intervention.41
Developing countries
therefore combined their majorities in the United Nations to pass
resolutions condemning the corrupt practices of multinational
corporations.42
In 1974, a United Nations Commission on
Transnational Corporations was also established to formulate the
major principles and issues involved in formulating a Code of
Conduct for transnational corporations.43
The spirit behind
formulating a Code of Conduct was inspired by the 1974 General
Assembly resolution on the Declaration of a New International
Economic Order (“NIEO”).44 The NIEO was the climactic moment
for developing countries in their quest to reform the international
political economy favorably towards them. Paragraph 4 of the
corporations during the Securities and Exchange Commission’s corruption
hearings in the 1970s); S.K. Verma, International Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations, 20 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 20, 20–23 (1980) (focusing on payoffs made by
transnational corporations in the context of the role that transnational
corporations play in undermining host countries’ fiscal and monetary policies).
39 Verma, supra note 38 at 20 n.3.
40 1976 Declaration of the Heads of States, 5th Conference of the Non-Aligned
States, Economic Declaration, reprinted in 27 REV. INT’L AFF. 31, 35 (1976).
41 Id.
42 E.g., G.A. Res. 3514, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess. (Dec. 15, 1975)
(condemning all corrupt practices by corporations that violate the laws and
regulations of host countries).
43 U.N. Comm’n on Transnational Corporations, Intergovernmental Working
Group on the Code of Conduct, Report on the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N.
Doc. E/C.10/31 (May 4, 1977) (prepared by Sten Miklasson), reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
709 (1977).
44 See G.A. Res. 3201, at 3, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (May 1, 1974) (aiming to alleviate the imbalance between developing and
developed countries and to promote economic and social progress and peace).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

140

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:1

Declaration entitled developing countries to have regulatory
authority over the activities of transnational corporations. The
spirit of the NIEO was reinforced by the U.N. Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.45
Ultimately, the NIEO agenda was deadlocked at the United
Nations. Western industrialized countries, particularly the U.S.,
rejected it.46 The promise of a code of conduct of multinational
corporations languished in the U.N. throughout the 1970s, but by
the beginning of the 1980s, changing views on the causes of lack of
economic growth in developing countries overshadowed the focus
on the corrupting influence of multinational corporations.
Attitudes had begun to shift towards corruption within countries
experiencing endemic corruption rather than on external causes of
corruption and lack of growth, such as the activities of
transnational corporations.
3.2. Developed Country Focus on Corruption within the OECD 19691990
While developing countries used the United Nations system to
pursue anti-corruption strategies, developed country governments
pursued these initiatives within the Organization for Economic
Development and Cooperation, (“OECD”), a standard setting
organization of the economic cooperation between European
countries and the United States. Similar to United Nations General
Assembly resolutions, the Declarations of the OECD are voluntary
and therefore are not legally enforceable.47
45 See G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2(2), U.N. GAOR 29th Sess. (Dec. 12, 1974)
(proclaiming that each State had the right to regulate transnational corporations
within its jurisdiction and to fully exercise sovereignty over its wealth, natural
resources, and economic activities).
46 Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, supra note 36.
47 Some scholars have, however, argued that voluntary codes such as the
Basel Accords are the most significant source of norms in international law today
and their influence on norms and state/non-state behavior ought not to be
understated. For more, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International
Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240 (2000), for an argument that a liberal
approach to international law recognizes various types of lawmaking that exist at
the individual, governmental, and state levels; and see Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 177 (Michael Byers ed., 2000), for a discussion on the
increasing role that participation in international regulatory organizations such as
the Basel Committee and the International Organisation of Securities
Commissioners play in allowing States to regulate an increasingly global
economy.
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For example, in its 1976 Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the OECD encouraged
multinational corporations to minimize problems in their relations
in developing countries by focusing on making positive economic,
social, and environmental contributions in these countries.48 The
guidelines specified that multinational corporations ought to
refrain from paying bribes or other improper payments to public
officials. They also called on these corporations not to make
contributions to holders of political office, contenders for such
office, or political parties.49 For purposes of enforcement, the
Guidelines recommended annual publication of the financial
activities of such corporations as well as compliance with the
national laws and policies of the host countries.50
3.3. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 1977-1989
It was not until the U.S. Congress became actively involved in
the embryonic stages of the international anti-bribery movement
that it began to grow teeth and credibility. Congressional attention
was spurred by revelations and acknowledgements that American
corporations were involved in giving bribes to foreign government
officials in return for procuring contracts or as sales commissions.51
Congressional attention was driven in part by the attention created
by the Watergate scandal52 and by virtue of the fact that the
payments to foreign government officials by U.S. multinational

48 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev [OECD]., OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises 14 (2008), available at http://oecd.org/dataoecdx561
/361922428.pdf.
49 Id. at 21.
50 Id. at 14–15.
51 See Repeal of Laws Aiding Multinationals Sought, 34 CONG. Q. 1026, 1026
(1976) (indicating that as of April 23, 1976, approximately eighty-four companies
had admitted to bribing foreign officials to win new contracts); Michael E.
Murphy, Payoffs to Foreign Officials: Time for More National Responsibility, 62 A.B.A.
J. 480, 480 (1976) (reporting that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
investigation indicated that American companies are commonly associated with
bribery and improper payments in developing countries where such practices are
commonplace); Peter Nehemkis, Business Payoffs Abroad: Rhetoric and Reality, 18
CAL. MGMT. REV. 5, 5 (1975) (noting the types of bribes paid by top American
companies operating overseas to obtain decisions from host governments that
would result in favorable business conditions); Schroth, supra note 38, 6–7.
52 Schroth, supra note 38, at 6–7.
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corporations were benefiting from tax exemptions enacted by
Congress.53
The high profile attention given to this issue is exemplified by
the appointment of a Special Presidential Task Force headed by a
cabinet member to study the problem in late March 197654 and a
special study issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) on the problem.55 Several congressional hearings were
also held and bills on the issue were proposed in the second
Congressional session of 1976.56 The SEC Report emphasized that
corrupt payments were adversely affecting public confidence in
American business.57 The SEC’s recommendations focused on
eliminating corrupt payments through express prohibition and
penalization as well as provided requirements for transparent and
honest internal auditing in accord with generally recognized
accounting principles.58
The Presidential Task Force’s
recommendations called for legislation requiring these
corporations to meet disclosure requirements only with regard to
material information.59
Unlike the SEC, the Presidential
Commission
excluded
from
its
recommendations
the
53 See generally Ronald P. Kane & Samuel Butler III, Improper Corporate
Payments: The Second Half of Watergate, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 17–21 (1976) (providing
an extensive history of the improper foreign payments made by Gulf Oil
Corporation and United Brands).
54 See Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminal Prosecution of United States Multinational
Corporations, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 485 (1977) (noting that the SEC prepared a
report to study corrupt payment in general and the President Task Force prepared
a report to study the specific problem of bribes to foreign officials).
55 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH
CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
SEC REPORT] (reporting the findings of the SEC study to determine the nature and
extent of questionable or illegal foreign payments and the potential effect such
activity will have on the U.S. economy); THE CARTER CENTER OF EMORY UNIVERSITY,
PERESTROIKA WITHOUT GLASNOST IN AFRICA 1 (1989) [hereinafter THE CARTER
CENTER] (discussing rising trends in innovative economic policies and how those
policies provoke challenges to political regimes) (quoting Michael Lofchie who
participated in the inaugural meeting at the Carter Center).
56 See Hermann, supra note 54, at 484–97 (outlining Congressional proposals
to deal with bribery and corruption).
57 See SEC REPORT, supra note 55, at 54 (concluding that the commission found
that the problem of questionable and illegal corporate payments is cause for a
deep concern).
58 See Hermann, supra note 54, at 491–92 (comparing the recommendations of
the studies prepared by the SEC and the Presidential Task Force).
59 Id. at 492.
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criminalization of payment of foreign government officials.60 It
was in this context, that Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977.
3.4. The World Bank’s Good Governance Initiative: 1989 Onward
In the 1990s, the term, “governance,” became widely accepted
as “a guiding principle to advance the conceptualization of
This report
contemporary African political processes.”61
inaugurated a new way of examining Africa’s economic and
political problems. According to this new view, bad governance
lies at the heart of poor economic and political performance in
postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa. Under this view, corruption is
one of the indicators of bad governance.62
Within the good governance agenda, either orthodox structural
adjustment or macroeconomic reform and stabilization are the
primary objective. These reforms are aimed at increasing the
productive capacities of the private sector as the engine of
economic growth, or releasing market forces from the clutches of
regulatory controls.
Releasing market forces within this
framework is premised on the protection and enforcement of the
private rights of property and freedom of contract and exchange by
using a system of public law. There are at least two major roles
assigned to public law and policy, the first to protect private
property against re-distributive interventionism and the second to
enforce contracts.
An important aspect of good governance programs is
identifying orthodox macroeconomic reform as imperative to subSaharan Africa reform. Thus, the good governance agenda is
focused on ensuring that sub-Saharan African economies lack the
institutional, political, and administrative mechanisms to support
orthodox macro-economic reform. Corruption has been identified
Id.
See THE CARTER CENTER, supra note 55, at 1 (quoting Michael Lofchie who
observed that governance better “enables us to range widely to determine
precisely where effective control of African societies lies. Governance does not
prejudge the locus or character of real decisional authority.”).
60
61

61

See DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MATTERS VII: AGGREGATE AND
INDIVIDUAL GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 1996–2007 7–8 (2008) (describing “control of
corruption” as a measurement in “perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”).
62
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as a major part of the institutional, administrative and political
problems inhibiting the success of macroeconomic reform.63
Transparency and accountability therefore are an important part of
the anti-corruption initiatives of the good governance agenda.64
Reforms aimed at de-regulating, liberalizing and privatizing the
economies of developing countries have also become central to
combating corruption.65
3.5. An International Consensus Emerges: Anti-Corruption Initiatives
as Central to Development Policy
By the mid-1990s, a consensus emerged placing corruption at
the center of development policy. Consequently, the World Bank
concluded in its 1997 World Development Report that without an
effective state, “sustainable development, both economic and
social, is impossible.”66 Corruption is now seen as detrimental to
both economic growth67 and private investment.68
63 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 4–5 (1992) (discussing
World Bank’s role in addressing economic reform and nurturing political
consensus for reforms); WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S
EXPERIENCE, vii–ix (1994) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S
EXPERIENCE] (concluding that “[g]ood governance is epitomized by predicable,
open, and enlightened policy-making . . . ; a bureaucracy imbued with a
professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions;
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs”).
64 GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE, supra note 63, at vii–ix
(discussing accountability of economic and social dimensions of governance to
produce change).
65 See Gathii, supra note 19, at 407 (providing an overview of anti-corruption
initiatives that rule of law donors have required the Kenyan government to
implement).
66 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1 (1997). See also Press Release,
IMF Interim Committee, Interim Committee Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable
Global Growth (Sept. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Declaration on Partnership], available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/dec.pdf.
67 See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 683 (1995)
(finding that corruption lowers levels of private investment and economic
growth); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 611
(1993) (acknowledging that most studies suggest “existing corruption levels are
detrimental to development.”); Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public
Investment, and Growth (INT’L MONETARY FUND, Working Paper No. 97/139, Oct.
1997) (reviewing five channels through which corruption lowers economic
growth).
68 See Alberto Alesina et al., Political Instability and Economic Growth (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4173, 1992) (concluding that in
“countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse,
growth is significantly lower than otherwise”).
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Even the IMF, which had initially been reluctant to embrace the
good governance agenda as being too political and outside its
strictly economic mandate, eventually embraced it in the mid1990s.69 In September 1996, the IMF Board of Governors adopted a
Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth, which
emphasized the importance of “[p]romoting good governance in
all its aspects, specifying the need for rule of law, improving the
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling
corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which
economies can prosper.”70 Furthermore, in 1997, the IMF’s Board
of Governors adopted a guidance note, Good Governance—The
IMF’s Role, which sought to promote greater attention to
governance issues. The guidance note called for a proactive
advocacy of policies promoting good governance issues within the
Fund’s mandate and expertise such as the proper “management of
public resources (including sales of public assets), and the
development and maintenance of a transparent economic and
regulatory environment conducive to private sector activity.”71 In
February 2001, the IMF Executive Board evaluated the 1997
Guidance Note in a staff paper, Review of the Fund’s Experience in
Governance Issues.72 In addition to endorsing the Fund’s evolving
approach in dealing with the issue of governance, the paper
stressed that corruption prevention should be the centerpiece of
the IMF’s governance strategy.

69 See Joseph Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited By Articles of
Agreement When the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, 12 IMF SURVEY
146, 146–147 (1983) (commenting that because political considerations are not
completely isolated from economic ones, it may be appropriate for the IMF to
develop policies to help member nations achieve their social and political
objectives if those objectives if the economic consequences of those objectives are
consistent with IMF’s purposes); See also James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a
Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in
International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107, 147–63 (1999) (discussing the
World Bank’s implementation of good-governance incentive programs).
70 Declaration on Partnership, supra note 66, at 1.
71 Abdoulaye Bio-Tchane, Afr. Dep’t, IMF, Speech on Governance at the
Africa Development Bank Symposium on New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (May 27, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np
/speeches/2002/052702a.htm.
72 See Pol’y Dev. & Rev. Dep’t., Int’l Monetary Fund, Review of Funds
Experience in Governance Issues (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external
/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm (discussing the IMF’s initiatives to promote
good governance).
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The World Bank has developed six aggregate indicators to
evaluate the quality of governance in a country and the control of
corruption. The measurement uses as an indicator the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand corruption. The other indicators are voice and
accountability, political stability and the absence of violence,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law.73
World Bank data shows that countries with vibrant democracies,
such as Portugal, Chile, and Canada have very little corruption. By
contrast, countries with little voice and accountability, like
Zimbabwe, tend to have more corruption.74
4.

HOW DOES HUMAN RIGHTS FIT INTO THE ANTI -CORRUPTION
AGENDA?

4.1. Introduction
Section 3 showed that corruption emerged as a governance
concern in the Bretton Woods institutions rather than as a human
rights concern within the human rights bodies of the United
Nations. This Section therefore locates corruption within the
framework of international human rights. It does so in the specific
context of Kenya although the human rights issues canvassed are
challenges in many similar countries. This Section begins with a
conceptual overview of the relationship between corruption and
human rights in the Kenyan context. It focuses on issues relating
to freedom of expression as it relates to anti-corruption initiatives.
It discusses several judicial opinions interpreting a variety of
freedom of expression issues such as press freedom and libel as
they relate to corruption. It also discusses a variety of social and
economic rights as they relate to corruption in the country as well
73 WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, A DECADE OF MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE:
GOVERNANCE MATTERS 2006: WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, 9–12 (2006)
[hereinafter QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE]; Kaufman, supra note 62, at 7–8.
74 See QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 73, at 7 (elaborating on the link
between “the idea that when citizens can demand more accountability through
the ballot box, or where there is freedom of expression, of the media, and of
information, governments become cleaner and less corrupt”); Melissa A. Thomas,
What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?, Oct., 2006, available at
http://www.cityindicators.org/Deliverables/Measuring%20Governance_1-2
-2007-836890.pdf (providing critique of what worldwide governance indicators
really measure).
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as the separation of powers issues that have hobbled the anticorruption agenda in the country. This Section demonstrates that
it is really those who stand to lose most from the exposure of
corruption who are likely to defend and vindicate their rights in
the judiciary. Thus, while rights are important in exposing
corruption, in the context of Kenya, they have often been used to
override the full implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in
the country. The section ends with ideas on how to transform the
anti-corruption agenda utilizing rights.
4.2. Corruption and Human Rights Conceptually and in the Kenyan
Context
The protection of human rights is inversely affected by the
presence of corruption in a society.75 This means that high levels of
corruption in a society are likely to disable a state from fulfilling its
duties to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of its
citizens.76 Some international organizations, including the Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights, have even gone so far as
to consider corruption a “crime against humanity.”77 This is due to
the undermining effect corruption has on the ability of a state to
comply with its human rights obligations—it erodes both the
state’s capacity to and the public’s confidence that the state will
deliver services to the public.78
Since corruption depletes resources available for public
spending, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights has argued that corruption prohibits a state from
taking steps to maximize “its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.”79 Moreover, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
75 See United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) (taking the view that corruption is adversely
related to the realization of human rights).
76 Id.
77 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 23.
78 See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights and the Gov’t of Pol.,
U.N. Conf. on Anti-Corruption Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights,
Background Note, ¶ 3, HR/POL/GG/SEM/2006/2 (Nov. 8–9, 2006) [hereinafter
Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures] (acknowledging that elements of the U.N.
human rights system have commented on the inability of states to comply with
their obligations as a result of corruption).
79 Id. ¶ 6.
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noted that corruption has a negative effect on Kenya’s
implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child.80
Corruption not only depletes resources that might otherwise be
spent on essential public functions:
[C]orrupt management of public resources compromises
the Government’s ability to deliver an array of services,
including health, educational and welfare services, which
are essential for the realization of economic, social and
cultural rights. Also, the prevalence of corruption creates
discrimination in access to public services in favour of those
able to influence the authorities to act in their personal
interest, including by offering bribes. The economically
and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately
from the consequences of corruption, because they are
particularly dependent on public goods.81
In addition, in a society with a high incidence of corruption as
well as a lack of aggressive efforts to hold those responsible
accountable, one would also anticipate a high prevalence of human
rights abuse at the horizontal level.82 That is to say, human rights
80 See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Kenya, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.160
(Nov. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Concluding Observations] (attributing partial
responsibility for the difficulties impeding the implementation of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child to the rampant corruption within Kenya). See also
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: Tajikistan, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.136 (Oct. 23, 2000)
(noting the difficulties which corruption has posed to the implementation of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in Tajikistan); Comm. on the Rights of the
Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Georgia, ¶
18–19, U.N. Doc CRC/C/15/Add.124 (June 28, 2000) (stating that corruption has
negatively affected the ability of Georgia to allocate budgetary resources in favor
of children to the level required under the Convention on the Rights of the Child);
Terracino, supra note 1, at 12–13 (listing many of the rights of a child that may be
violated due to corruption).
81 Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures, supra note 78, ¶ 6; see also Concluding
Observations, supra note 80, ¶ 9, for a discussion regarding the Committee on the
Rights of the Child’s acknowledgment that corruption has a negative effect on the
implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child with reference to
Kenya.
82 While states have the primary responsibility to ensure internationally and
constitutionally guaranteed rights are protected, respected, and fulfilled, private
actors—including individuals—have obligations not to violate human rights. The
duties individuals have regarding human rights are recognized in Part I, Chapter
II of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, which Kenya has signed
and ratified. See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, pt. 1, ch.
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abuses among and between individuals in a society with high
levels of corruption are likely to be high.83 The Waki Commission
reinforced the link between corruption and violence, on the one
hand, and the egregious violations of human rights that have
accompanied elections in Kenya since 1992, on the other hand.84
By contrast, countries where respect for human rights is high are
unlikely to experience a high prevalence of corruption. This is
supported by rankings in Transparency International’s annual
Corruption Perception Index for 2008.85

2, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5 (June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 58. Article 27, for
example, provides that every “individual shall have duties towards his family and
society” as well as the State and other “legally recognized communities.” Id. pt. 1,
ch. 2, art. 27. Article 29(4) obliges the individual to “preserve and strengthen
social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened.” Id. pt. 1,
ch. 2, art. 29(4). As such, individuals who killed others, who took part in planning
to cause chaos, or who gave their support in aid of those that caused the violence
acted inconsistently with Article 27 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights. See Id. pt. 1, ch. 2, art. 27 (proclaiming the obligatory duties of every
individual toward society, the state, and other legally recognized communities,
and requiring that the rights and freedoms of every individual be exercised with
respect toward the rights of others, collective security, morality, and the common
interest).
83 A good Kenyan example of this is the large pyramid scheme perpetrated on
Kenyans by Kenyans in 2007 in which 2.4–2.6 million shillings were invested by
Kenyan people in a company promising huge returns on the investment (upwards
of 300%), promises which the owners knew to be false and which they never
intended to repay. See Woman Denies Sh2.4m Pyramid Scheme Fraud, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), June 14, 2007, at 7 and Lucas Barasa & Jeff Otieno, Victims of Pyramid
Schemes Speak Out, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), July 4, 2007, at 4–5 for a more detailed
description of such schemes.
While there is no apparent government
involvement, a lack of accountability and the ability to redress grievances has
made it difficult for the victims to get their money back. Despite government
orders not to allow money to be withdrawn, corrupt bank managers are still
allowing the perpetrators to withdraw money made from the pyramid scheme.
84 See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON POST ELECTION VIOLENCE, REPORT ON POSTELECTION VIOLENCE 444 (2008) [hereinafter WAKI COMMISSION REPORT] (“[T]he
elements of systemic and institutional deficiencies, corruption, and entrenched
negative socio-political culture, have in our view, caused and promoted impunity
in this country.”), available at http://www.eastandard.net/downloads
/Waki_Report.pdf. See also Patricia Nyhan & Helen Epstein, Kenya’s Unfinished
Democracy: A Human Rights Agenda for the New Government, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH,
Dec. 2008, at 5–6, 15–16 [hereinafter Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy] for a
description of the violence and human rights violations occurring during the 1992
and 1997 Kenyan presidential elections.
85 See Transparency Int’l, 2008 Corruption Perception Index (2008) (assigning all
countries a Corruption Perception Index score and ranking them based upon the
levels of corruption within each country as they are perceived by various business
people and country analysts surveyed by Transparency International).
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Anti-corruption initiatives fall within the rubric of good
governance. The good governance agenda is mutually reinforcing
and overlapping with the values embodied in national and
international human rights instruments. For example, the anticorruption measures aimed at achieving transparency and
accountability86 that give individuals the right to expose
wrongdoing simultaneously promote the realization of the right to
freedom of expression. Furthermore, an atmosphere in which
rights are generally respected is likely to be one in which
individuals are free to report incidents of corruption and,
therefore, one that enables activism against corruption. This is
why the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(“UNCAC”) requires that states enact so-called “Whistleblower
Laws” to ensure the protection of those who come forward and
expose governmental corruption.87 Unfortunately, whistleblowers
in Kenya all too often forfeit their jobs, health, or lives for exposing
egregious incidents of corruption.88 Such consequences are due, in
part, to the all too lenient Kenyan laws in place for the protection
of whistleblowers.89 The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
(“KACC”) has called for the repeal and revision of these laws
because, although the harassment and/or intimidation of
whistleblowers is prohibited, the law does not have any penalty or
punishment in place for those who choose to break the law. Even
the “KACC [has] no powers to arrest and prosecute the
offenders.”90
Examples here include rules extending protection for whistleblowers.
See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 40–41 (noting that
failure to enact such laws leaves
“witnesses and victims unprotected[,]
encourages corrupt practices and impunity, and discourages witnesses from
fulfilling a public responsibility.”)
88 See, e.g., Fred Mukinda, Murder Police Squad on the Loose, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi), Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056
/534982/-/view/printVersion/-/151ym2z/-/index.html (claiming that “Kenya’s
ability to protect whistle blowers is in question following the officer’s shooting”);
Press Release, Office of Public Communications (Kenya), Whistleblowers Security
Enhanced, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.communication.go.ke/news.asp?id=106
(noting that whistleblowers “are sometimes threatened with either murder or
violence or both, [and] risk employer retaliation that could lead to job dismissal,
demotion, transfer, no promotion, and no assignment of duties”).
89 See Amos Kareithi, KACC Stands up for Whistleblowers, EAST AFRICAN
STANDARD, Aug. 22, 2007, at 9 (quoting the Kenya Anti-Corruption Committee as
saying that the Witness Protection Act of 2006 “is not enough to protect witnesses
in graft cases.”).
90 Id.
86
87
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4.3. Freedom of Expression
Corruption flourishes in countries that limit public knowledge
about the manner in which governments and actors in the private
sector make decisions.91 The United Nations Convention against
Corruption has even gone so far as to outline a list of categories of
information that a government should make public.92 This list
includes: management of public finances, hiring of public officials,
public administration, and general decision-making processes in
the government.93 Such items are included because a lack of
information about the criteria a government uses to make
budgetary allocations for health and education does not promote
openness. In addition, when those allocations reveal favor towards
some regions of a country and disfavor toward others, without the
opportunity and freedom to question such allocations, corruption
has the perfect opportunity to thrive. Further, corruption is likely
to thrive when the criteria for awarding government contracts or
selling government property are vague and such transactions are
undertaken without providing information about such criteria to
the public.
In short, “information in the control of public authorities is a
valuable public resource and . . . public access to such information
promotes greater transparency and accountability of those public
authorities.”94 As such, when citizens have access to information
about how and why their government and private sector actors
make decisions that affect them, there is greater room for
transparency and accountability.
91 See Kumar, Corruption Development, supra note 9, at 491–96, for a detailed
example of this phenomenon in Japanese society.
92 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 13 (identifying various
categories of information which a government should make public in order to
fight corruption and ensure effective government accountability).
93 Id.
94 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, USING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AS AN ANTICORRUPTION TOOL, 5 (2006), available at http://www.transparency.org
/publications/publications/right2know (internal citations and quotations
omitted). One area in Kenya where the citizens have been grossly uninformed is
in the area of voting and voters’ rights. Ms. Koki Muli has said that many
politicians distribute money, food items, or both in exchange for votes and the
Kenyan people have never been informed that this is illegal and that these bribes
should not be accepted. See Susan Anyangu, Bribery of Voters Condemned, EAST
AFRICAN STANDARD, July 16, 2007, at 10.
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The foregoing principles hold largely true in Kenya.
Corruption thrived in Kenya, especially following the systematic
dismantling of the rule of law and tenets of good governance
during the one-party era in the 1980s. In the 1990s, corruption
continued to thrive as significant economic reforms were
implemented in the absence of legal restraints against corruption.
Momentous transfers of wealth occurred in secrecy as public
corporations were privatized and fell into the hands of powerful
and highly connected individuals within the Moi government.
Thus, when a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the murder of
Robert Ouko—who was, at the time of his murder, the Kenyan
Minister for Foreign Affairs—began revealing high-stakes
corruption among those close to President Daniel arap Moi, the
government disbanded the Commission in order to foreclose
more revelations.95 In addition, when civil society groups began
exposing corruption through documentation, President Daniel Moi
extended his repression to such groups. As such, in 1995, the Moi
government banned a non-governmental organization, the Center
for Law and Research International (Clarion), which had published
an early report on corruption in Kenya.
4.4. Why Freedom of Expression is Important
Effective strategies for combating corruption depend on the
ability to expose corruption in the first place. Freedom of
expression is an important prerequisite for encouraging a “political
culture that encourages, nurtures and reinforces exposure and
punishment” of corruption.96 Respect for freedom of expression
also leads to exposure of the causes and consequences of
corruption and an atmosphere within which anti-corruption

95 See Aidan Hartley, A Political Murder, AFR. REP., May–June 1990, at 17–20
(discussing the murder of Minister Ouko, the political climate in Kenya at the
time, and the ensuing government efforts to repress dissent); Robert I. Rotberg,
U.S. Should Push Kenya’s Moi Toward Genuine Reform, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 5, 1991, at 19 (examining President Moi’s corrupt practices and his possible
involvement in the death of Minister Ouko).
96 ANYANG’ NYONG’O, A LEAP INTO THE FUTURE: A VISION FOR KENYA’S SOCIOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 91 (2007); See Kumar, Corruption
Development, supra note 9, at 491–96, for a discussion regarding how the Japanese
context provides a striking example of this phenomenon. While Japan is one of
the more developed nations in the world, it still greatly struggles to curb
governmental corruption, particularly within the legislature, due in large part to
the press not freely exposing corruption.
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strategies can be pursued.97 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights98 and the Constitution of Kenya guarantee the
right to hold opinions and to express them without any
interference.99 This right includes the freedom to impart, to seek
and to receive information and ideas of all kinds, in any form or
medium, without interference by the government or private
parties.
While times have changed, Kenyan governments from colonial
times to the present have imposed heavy-handed measures
limiting the printing, publication and distribution of information
that dared expose corruption in government. Magazines such as
Nairobi Law Monthly, Society and Finance were banned, their editors
jailed and the printing presses they used were raided and often
destroyed.100 Even as recently as 2003, the then newly elected
Kibaki government raided the printing presses of a leading
newspaper after it published information critical of the
government. In the same year, Attorney General Amos Wako
raised newspaper and magazine registration and bond fees by high
margins, a move publishers of alternative newspapers—who were
often unafraid to expose high level corruption—alleged was aimed
at putting them out of business and stifling expression.101
97 See generally Helen Darbishire, The Rights of Access to Information in Fighting
Corruption—A Human Rights Perspective (July 28, 2007) (unpublished paper
prepared for the International Council on Human Rights Policy, Review Meeting
on Corruption and Human Rights) (examining how the right to information, and
government efforts to protect that right, leads to the exposure and prevention of
corruption), available at http://www.ichrp.org/en/search?q=Helen+Darbishire
(follow “Right to Information as a Tool to Combat Corruption” link).
98 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (decreeing a universal right to freedom of
opinion and expression).
99 Section 79(1) of the Constitution provides:
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the
enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold
opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information
without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information
without interference (whether the communication be to the public
generally or to any person or class of persons) and freedom from
interference with his correspondence.

CONSTITUTION, Art. 79(1) (2008) (Kenya).
100 See James Thuo Gathii, Freedom of Expression Without a Free Press: An
Inquiry Into a Kenyan Paradox (1995) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law
School) (on file with author).
101 See COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, ATTACKS ON THE PRESS 2003: KENYA
(2004), available at http://cpj.org/2004/03/attacks-on-the-press-2003-kenya.php
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Fortunately, in a decision on October 3rd, 2008 dealing with the
dismissal of a defamation case, the High Court noted that large
damage awards in some defamation cases were “not founded on a
clearly demonstrable basis of compensation for [the] injury
suffered” and were, therefore, a clear departure from Court of
Appeals’ precedent.102
In October 2003, the minister in charge of security, Chris
Murungaru, in justifying the arrest and detention for three days of
a journalist and for six hours of two others, argued that journalists
are not above the law and that these arrests and detention were in
Kenya’s national security interests. This statement ominously
hearkened back to the regrettable, dark days of press repression
under single-party rule in Kenya. In the 1980s and 1990s, President
Moi used national security as a rationale to heavily restrict the
press’s freedom. Such repression was justified on the premise that
Section 79(2) of the Constitution, which enables the government to
limit freedom of expression in the public interest.103 The judiciary
in turn developed jurisprudence deferential to the government’s
authority to limit the press’s freedom in the public interest. In all
these instances, the harassment, unjustified arrest and prosecution
of journalists—often on trumped up charges—effectively led to the
infringement of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression and
information.104

(reporting that Wako “raised the libel insurance bond that publishers must pay
the government from 10,000 Kenyan shillings (U.S. $130) to 1 million Kenyan
shillings (U.S. $13,200) and penalizes vendors who sell unlicensed publications.
Anyone caught selling illegal publications faces six months in jail and a fine of
20,000 Kenyan shillings (U.S. $265)”); see also Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra
note 84, at 17 (reporting that numerous Kenyan journalists believe that
defamation laws are the greatest threat to freedom of expression because an often
corrupt judiciary will set damage awards artificially high, bankrupting smaller
news outlet that cannot afford the damages and thus encouraging selfcensorship).
102 Jillo Kadida, Kenya: Court Throws Out Kiunjuri Case on Defamation Against
“Nation”, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.nation
.co.ke/news/-/1056/477000/-/tkx6nh1-/index.html.
103 See CONSTITUTION, art. 79(2) (2008) (Kenya) (stating that exceptions to
freedom of expression can be made when it is reasonably required for defense and
public policy).
104 Darbishire, supra note 97, at 3 (discussing the fundamental human right of
access to information); see also Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 14–
15 (describing the case of several land reform advocates being arrested on
trumped up murder charges in order to silence their protests of the Kenyan
government’s land grabbing policies).
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Highly connected Kenyans used the judiciary, through
defamation suits, to chill the ability of the press to report on
allegations or reports of corruption.105 Legislative reforms passed
by the one party parliament prior to the first multi-party elections
in 1992 enhanced damage awards for those found to have been
defamed further compromised the development of a lively, open
and free press and particularly hampered the press’s ability to
expose the misdeeds of politicians of the one party era.106 While
defamation suits have been used to make corruption public, the
High Court in Francis Lotodo v. Star Publishers declined to limit the
distribution of allegedly defamatory statements.107 The court held
that the public’s interest in free expression was more important,
unless the applicant could show that there was “a substantial risk
of grave injustice and the private interest in preventing the
discussion outweighs the public interest.”108 However, Kenyan
courts have limited the ability of the press to freely report even
when the issues involved were of general public interest, such as
the common law sub-judice rule109 (commonly cited by corrupt
officials) and the lack of a community of interest between readers
and newspapers.110
Another way in which the government has limited reporting
on corruption is through the use of the so-called “Official Secrets

105 See Oraro v. Mwangi, petition 1205 of 1993 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi
July 6, 1993) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (awarding the plaintiff, a lawyer,
1.5 million Kenyan Shillings, roughly $33,000 U.S. dollars). The previous highest
award prior to the amendment had been one-fifteenth of this amount. See P.G.
Okoth v. Wachira, appeal 48 of 1977 (Court of Appeal for Kenya) (unreported),
cited in Gibson Kamau Kuria, The Interpretation of the Law of the Press in Kenya, THE
ADVOCATE, June 1994, at 18.
106 “Provided that where the libel is in respect of an offence punishable by
death the amount assessed shall not be less than one million shillings [U.S.
$20,000], and where the libel is in respect of an offence punishable by
imprisonment for a term of not less than three years the amount assessed shall not
be less than four hundred thousand shillings [U.S. $5000].” The Defamation Act,
(2005) Cap. 36 § 16A (Kenya). These amounts are exorbitant even for the big,
foreign-owned newspapers.
107 Lotodo v. Star Pubishers, petition 883 of 1998, (High Ct. of Kenya at
Nairobi May 12, 1998) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search).
108 Id. at *3.
109 The sub-judice rule bars newspapers from reporting on cases filed in the
courts that are not yet the subject of open court proceedings. For details, please
refer to George Oraro, supra note 103.
110 See Daily Nation v. Mukundi, (1975) E.A.L.R. 311, 315 (Kenya).
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Act.”111 In the recent past, the Kibaki government defended the
lack of transparency in the military’s procurement of contracts
through the need for secrecy surrounding such national security
matters. The then Minister of State in charge of National Security
and the Provincial Administration, Chris Murungaru, defended
the Kibaki government from charges of wrongdoing on the
grounds that the previous government had entered into most of
the contracts and that his government simply inherited them.112
Regarding the Navy ship contract—procured while he was
Minister of State in charge of National Security—Murungaru
argued that, before it was awarded to a Spanish consortium of
companies, there had been a procurement process involving eight
international companies. He claimed this was done even though,
among all nations, contracts for national security items are
awarded through closed bidding and single sourcing methods.113
Remarkably, the High Court has effectively held that the
government’s interest in contractual confidentiality supersedes the
public’s interest in investigating allegations of corruption in a
contract between the government and a corporation.114
Only rarely has the judiciary spoken in defense of press
freedom in the manner it did in Cyrus Jirongo v. Nation
Newspapers.115 In Cyrus Jirongo, the court observed that the “public
at large has a interest in knowing how public funds are being spent
by a statutory corporation that administers public funds.”116 The
allegation that public funds were being wasted made the public
interest in the case more significant than in cases where
newspapers were restricted from printing information. Similarly,
111 See The Preservation of Public Security Act, (2005) Cap. 57. (Kenya)
(stating rules and regulations for the preservation of public security).
112 Murungaru Speaks Out on Graft Claims, DAILY NATION, Feb. 8 2006, available
at http://www.nation.co.ke/magazines/-/1190/106754/-/lstujfz/-/index.html.
113 According to Murungaru, “[I]t is the practice the world over, including in
the ‘democracy champions’ that are Britain and the U.S., for military and securityrelated acquisitions to be done through closed tenders and often through single
sourcing.” Id.
114 See Nedermar Technology BV Ltd. v. Kenya Anti-Corruption Comm’n,
petition 290 of 2006 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi Oct. 30, 2008) (Elec. Kenyan L.
Rep., Case Search) (holding that the public interest is safeguarded where the
Kenyan government asserts a defense of contractual confidentiality to corruption
charges brought in the Hague).
115 THE ARTICLE 19 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HANDBOOK 160–61 (Sandra Coliver
ed., 1993) (discussing Jirongo v. Nation Newspapers Ltd., No. 5276 (High Ct.)
(Kenya) (1992)).
116 Id.
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in Kamlesh Pattni v. Attorney General the High Court held that
media publicity per se does not constitute a violation of the right to
a fair hearing.117
4.5. Freedom of Expression in the Context of Donor Criticism of
Government Corruption
In September 1991, Denmark announced aid cuts to Kenya
following a report that official corruption had siphoned off over
$40 million (U.S.) from Danish-sponsored projects in 1990.
Norway, another donor critical of Moi-era corruption, strongly
protested the arrest of Koigi Wa Wamwere upon his return to
Kenya in October 1991. The large amounts of aid flowing in from
Denmark and Norway put Kenya in a high-risk situation for
corruption to have a widespread impact on human rights because
of the large amount of money available to the government for
misuse. This risk is especially high when coupled with the fact
that the government decisions in Kenya were generally not
transparent or open to the general public.118 Norway’s criticism
and growing concerns about corruption led the Kenyan
government to terminate diplomatic links with Norway.
Announcing the termination, then Foreign Affairs minister Ndolo
Ayah condemned Norway for providing sanctuary to Kenyan
“criminal fugitives.” Said Ayah:
We cannot be held ransom by anybody in terms of aid or
otherwise [sic]. This country cannot be told what to do,
how to do it, just because somebody happens to be giving
us aid. Aid has to be given in the context of respect,
friendship and good relations between countries.119
This termination of diplomatic ties with Norway was
overwhelmingly endorsed by a Parliamentary resolution in the
single-party Parliament.
While the Nation Alliance of Rainbow Coalition government of
President Kibaki that ascended to power more than a decade later
did not cut diplomatic ties with the U.K. or the growing number of
117 The holding was affirmed in Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenya AntiCorruption Commission and Another (Murungaru II), petition 54 of 2006 (High Ct. of
Kenya at Nairobi Dec. 1, 2006) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search).
118 See generally supra Section 4.4 (Why Freedom of Expression is Important).
119 See James Gathii, Center for Law and Research, Int’l Legal Political
Transition Project, The External Interest in Kenya’s Impending Change 16 (2002).
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nations critical of Kenya’s high-level official corruption, Kiraitu
Murungi’s advice that these embassies should stay within the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sounds quite similar
to Ndolo Ayah’s 1991 address to Norway. The Ayah-Murungi
position that donors should not interfere with Kenya’s sovereignty
by criticizing the government of suspected or existing corruption
ignores Kenya’s freely ratified international, anti-corruption
treaties. Further, Kenya’s sovereignty cannot be so fragile that it
must be defended by invoking the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, as Kiraitu did, or by suspending diplomatic
ties, as the Kenya African National Union government did in 1991.
More importantly, since the end of the Cold War, new criteria
relating to government recognition have emerged. The criteria for
collective non-recognition have evolved to constitute a set of
prerequisites. This set includes:





Support for democracy and the rule of law,
emphasizing the key role of elections in the democratic
process.
Safeguarding human rights, based on a respect for the
individual and including equal treatment of ethnic
minorities.
Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to
international security and regional stability.
Commitment to free markets in their economic
programs including protecting the rights of foreign
investment and guaranteeing a framework for the
uninhibited entry of foreign investments consistent with
the requirements of the World Trade Organization and
Bretton Woods institutions

A government that does not meet these criteria may be in
danger of collective non-recognition. Notably, these criteria are
also incorporated in the constitutive documents of the African
Union as well its economic agenda, stated in the New Economic
Partnership for African Development.120 There is in fact a peer
review process under the auspices of the African Union
120 For a more in-depth analysis, please refer to James Gathii, A Critical
Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in
an Era of Market Centered Development, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179
(2003).
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measuring—on a voluntary basis—a country’s adherence to
policies of good governance, human rights, and the rule of law.
Under international law, de-recognition and non-recognition are
measures usually taken as a last resort. They are typically
preceded by negotiation as well as an assortment of other
measures seeking to influence a state’s behavior, such as
suspension
from
certain
international
forums,
open
condemnations, and sanctions.121 When it occurs, de-recognition
takes a variety of forms. It may involve cessation of development
assistance from bilateral partners, suspension of loans from the
Bretton Woods institutions until certain conditions are met, or a
reluctance of international capital and business to invest in a
country where the government is identified as a pariah in the
international community.
In addition, non-governmental organizations such as
Transparency International, which monitor corruption within
governments, are also pushing the boundaries between ‘good’ and
‘bad’ states. This has certainly been seen within the bounds of
market reformers, especially in the Bretton Woods institutions and
the leading industrial countries, as will be explored more fully in
Section 3. Another reason the Ayah- Kiraitu thesis rings hollow
today is that Kenya has signed onto international treaties aimed at
combating corruption. These treaties are the United Nations
Convention against Corruption122 and the African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.123 By
virtue of being signatories to these two treaties, Kenya has
transformed corruption from an issue of purely domestic concern
to one that has international legal responsibilities. In fact, as the
High Court noted in the Murungaru case, “These [treaties] are the

121 For example, in early 2002 when President Mugabe was roundly
condemned by the United Kingdom and the United States for his land policies
and his alleged involvement in rigging his election, a number of African states
hesitated to critique him. See Dagi Kimani, Why African States Won’t Condemn
Mugabe, THE EAST AFRICAN, Mar. 4, 2002, available at http://www.theeastafrican
.co.ke/news/-/2558/239632/-/t7e2o3z/-/index.html; Adolf Mkenda, Why I
refuse to condemn Mugabe, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, May 7, 2009 (discussing why the
West has been more critical of Mugabe than other leaders who have worse records
in the areas of human rights and democracy).
122 G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 75.
123 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July
11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5.
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standards upon which the Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economic
Crimes Act must be measured.”124
4.6. Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption Cases
As in the prosecution of any criminal case, the investigation
and prosecution of corruption cases implicates the due process
rights of those under investigation and prosecution. While the
investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes is impugned
where these rights are violated, there is also the potential for using
these due process rights to defeat corruption charges and
prosecution. In this section, the discussion centers on three
examples of how well-placed corruption defendants have used the
Bill of Rights under the Kenyan Constitution to stop corruption
prosecutions against them.125 At the moment, the Kenya AntiCorruption Commission lists no less than thirty constitutional
petitions challenging the constitutionality of its corruption
proceedings, including its investigations, charges, search warrants,
and the retrieval of documentary evidence.
One of the most widely reported cases involving due process
rights in the corruption context is Republic v. Judicial Comms’n of
Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair ex parte Saitoti (hereinafter the
Saitoti decision).126 In this case, a three-judge Constitutional Court
held that a recommendation made by a Commission of Inquiry
into the Goldenberg Corruption Affair violated the applicant’s
pretrial rights to a fair trial. According to the Court, the
Commissioners made several remarks, errors, and decisions that
not only demonstrated bad faith and bias, but also violated the
applicant’s “constitutional assurance that he will have a fair trial
124

added:

See Murungaru II, at *43 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search). The Court

This is so because, the greatest threat to the socio-economic and political
substratum in the 21st Century are the quadruple evils of corruption,
terrorism, drug trafficking and their attendant consequence, money
laundering. Consequently all trading nations of the world at various
stages of civilization and democratization have initiated and/or have
passed similar legislation.
Id.
125 See, e.g., Republic v. Jud. Comm’n of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair ex
parte George Saitoti, petition 102 of 2006 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi July 31,
2006) (finding that prosecuting Saitoti would be contrary to the Constitution of
Kenya).
126 Id.
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and presumption of innocence.”127 According to the Court, in
recommending investigation of the applicant, the Commission of
Inquiry failed to take into account information it had received that
demonstrated the applicant’s innocence. For example, the Court
noted the Commission had ignored information that the payments
at issue in the Goldenberg Affair had been made with
Parliamentary approval.
As such, the Commission’s
recommendation was also found to have been “indicative of bias”
and a “failure to act fairly, faithfully and impartially.”128 The Court
thus prohibited the Attorney General or any other person from
filing or even prosecuting the applicant for any matter relating to
the Goldenberg Affair.
This was not the first time that the High Court had issued
prohibitory orders against the Attorney General to prevent him
from bringing charges against a corruption suspect. In 2001, the
High Court had issued a similar order directing the Attorney
General not to bring any further charges that were similar to or a
variation of those brought against the then powerful cabinet of
Minister Kipng’eno Arap Ng’eny, because there had been a
lengthy and unexplained nine-year delay between the time of the
alleged commission of corruption offenses and the initiation of
prosecution by the Attorney General in April 2001.129 The Court
reasoned that having left office nine years earlier, the defendant no
longer had access to material to mount a defense.
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no limitation period with
respect to bringing charges against public officers for abuse of
office under Kenyan law, the High Court held that the nine-year
delay was not only oppressive but also “motivated by some
ulterior motive” 130 and therefore inconsistent with Section 77(1) of
the Constitution, which requires a criminal defendant to be
“afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial court.”131
127 Id. at *51 (stating that Section 77(1) of the Kenyan Constitution provides for
the presumption of innocence).
128 Id. at *56.
129 See Republic v. Attorney Gen. ex parte Kipng’eno Arap Ng’eny (Ng’eny
Case), petition 406 of 2001 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi Nov. 13, 2001) (Elec.
Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (prohibiting the Attorney General from bringing
any further charges against Ng’eny); see also MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at
12–14 for a detailed discussion of the Ng’eny case.
130 MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 25.
131 CONSTITUION OF KENYA, § 77(1) (1992).
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On the face, both the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions are very
plausible. They appear to aptly remedy procedural injustices
related to delays in bringing charges against corruption suspects.
Indeed justice delayed is justice denied. However, such a reading
of these decisions is completely off the mark. Not simply because
in both instances both persons charged were senior government
officials, but also because in both cases the courts narrowed their
inquiry merely to these due process and natural justice rights. This
goes against nearly a century of Kenyan criminal law
jurisprudence where it has always been the case that without an
express statutory provision, there can be no time limitation with
regards to prosecutions of criminal offenses.132
In addition, the courts failed to examine the broader context
against which the charges had been belatedly brought. It was not
until 1997 that an anti-corruption watchdog was eventually
established. For the first time, the short-lived Kenya AntiCorruption Authority brought charges against corruption suspects
in cases that the prosecuting authority in the country, the Attorney
General, had long neglected. Although the Attorney General is
constitutionally empowered to require the Commissioner of Police
to investigate any matter which relates to any alleged or suspected
offense,133 Attorney General Amos Wako has often argued that the
Commissioner of Police failed to comply with his directives to
investigate certain offenses.134 In short, a culture of impunity
developed in Kenya and when a new anti-corruption authority
was initiated towards the end of the 1990s, its efforts were hobbled
by claims of inordinate delays in beginning prosecutions. Further,
the Saitoti and Ng’eny courts fore-grounded the alleged violations
of constitutional rights while underplaying their role in buttressing
the nascent efforts to build a culture of accountability.135 In both
Saitoti and Ng’eny, the courts could have argued that the applicants
had yet to show that there was any affront to their rights, since the
courts had not even had a chance to establish whether the charges
brought against the applicants had any substance in the first place.
132 See MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 12–14 (discussing time limitations
with regards to criminal offenses).
133 CONSTITUION OF KENYA, § 26(4) (1992).
134 See WAKI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 453 (reprinting Attorney
General Wako’s Testimony to the Waki Commission regarding the shortcomings
of Kenya’s law enforcement in investigating certain types of charges).
135 Id.
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If the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions had been made to protect
individuals who were being unfairly harangued by the State, they
would be good law. These decisions would have been particularly
welcome in light of Kenya’s history of criminalization of dissent
and abuse of the criminal justice system for political purposes.136
Yet, nothing could be further from the possibility that these
decisions had been aimed at curbing such excesses.
A major problem with these decisions is that while they are
based on legally defensible conclusions, their effect was to nip in
the bud nascent efforts to establish institutions to prosecute corrupt
offenders and to build a culture of accountability in grand
corruption cases. The courts took no account of the fact that the
accused government officials operated within a constitutional,
legal and political system that was created and maintained
precisely to validate the very conduct for which the accused were
on trial.137
Clearly in both the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions, the use of the
Bill of Rights was to protect powerful members of the government
from an opportunity to be held accountable. That is why in
addition to having a culture that encourages exposure of
corruption, having law enforcement agencies that will investigate
without fear or favor and a judiciary that will independently try to
punish offenders are critical to the success of anti-corruption
strategies.138
Not only have procedural human rights been used by those in
power to defeat corruption charges, but so too have contract rights.
This came to the forefront in the Anglo-Leasing Scandal. In 2005,
First Mercantile Securities Corporation was the first of the AngloLeasing Companies to sue the Kenyan government for breach of
contract for non-payment.139
First Mercantile Securities
Corporation brought the suit in Swiss court and the Kenyan
136 The Author believes the decisions would also be welcome in light of
Kenya’s history of defendants having their due process rights violated when they
are forced to languish in remand prison for years while they await their day in
court.
137 See James Thuo Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making:
Comparing and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1125–
34 (2008) (discussing how issues of process, though important in validating the
new Constitution, had shut off other equally important considerations).
138 NYONG’O, supra note 96, at 78–95.
139 See KACC Stopped from Seeking True Identity of ‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firm, THE
EAST AFRICAN, July 30, 2007, at 1 (citing First Mercantile’s claims against the
Kenyan government).
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Government tried to use Mutual Legal Assistance to get the
particulars of the First Mercantile Securities Corporation.140 This
was done in an effort to get to the bottom of who had created the
company, who was running the company, whether they had ties to
the Kenyan Government, and who had facilitated this corrupt
agreement. However, First Mercantile was able to go to court in
Nairobi and prevent the Kenyan government from acquiring
further information on the grounds that if the information about
the company was revealed to Kenya, it would render the pending
action in Switzerland ‘nugatory’.141 The court ruled, in effect, that
the importance of contract rights trumped that of the fight against
corruption and the siphoning of public money. This decision is
based on legally defensible conclusions, however given the
massive amounts of money stolen from the government during the
Anglo-Leasing Scandal142 and the difficulty the government has
had getting to the bottom of it. It is unfortunate that the High
Court of Nairobi put a halt to the investigation.
In another case where the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
(“KACC”) was stymied on the basis of legally defensible
conclusions, a court ruled that section 31 of the Anti-Corruption
and Economic Crimes Act was unconstitutional.143 This section
gave the KACC the power to order people to give up their
passports if they are suspected of corruption or economic crime.
This ruling was also supported by Keriako Tobiko, the Kenyan
Director of Public Prosecutions who said that this law was “more
of an instrument of oppression than an aid to the fight against
corruption.”144

Id.
Jibril Adan & Judy Ogotu, Court Stops KACC’s Probe on Swiss Firm, THE
STANDARD, July 11, 2007, at 10; see also KACC Stopped from Seeking True Identity of
‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firm, supra note 139, at 2 (discussing background of First
Merchantile’s claims).
142 See KACC Stopped from Seeking True Identity of ‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firm, supra
note 139, at 2 (stating that the contract with First Mercantile Securities Corp. alone
was for a total sum of $12,716,250).
143 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act No. 03 § 31 (2003) (Kenya)
(“On the ex parte application of the Commission, a court may issue an order
requiring a person to surrender his travel documents to the Commission if (a) the
person is reasonably suspected of corruption or economic crime; and (b) the
corruption or economic crime concerned is being investigated.”).
144 Nyakundi Nyamboga, Blow on Graft Law Deserved—DPP, THE STANDARD
(Nairobi), June 27, 2007, at 10.
140
141
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Besides the foregoing cases, there have been several
constitutional challenges to the powers granted to the Kenya AntiCorruption Commission. Some cases challenge the Commission’s
power to ask a person suspected to have obtained wealth
fraudulently to declare such wealth. In one such case, the
applicant argued that these powers were unconstitutional because
they eroded the right to silence, the right against selfincrimination145 and the presumption of innocence,146
that
required one to be considered innocent until proven guilty.147 In
another case, the forfeiture provisions of these laws were
challenged for giving the KACC wide discretion that threatens to
undermine protected rights, including the right not to have private
property taken away arbitrarily.148 More recently, an increasing
number of defendants are challenging the legal status of the KACC
to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. High Court Judge
Nyamu barred the KACC from investigating an allegedly corrupt
contract in which the government paid 3 billion Kenyan
shillings.149 The basis for this ruling was that the KACC was not
allowed to investigate corruption cases that occurred before the
anti-corruption body was created. Additionally, First Mercantile
Securities and others have brought into question whether the
KACC has overstepped its constitutional bounds when it
investigates or prosecutes corruption cases.150

145 CONST. OF KENYA § 77(7) (2008) (“No person who is tried for a criminal
offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial.”).
146 Id. § 77(2)(a) (“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence . . .
shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty.”).
However, this is qualified by section 77(12)(a) (“Nothing contained in or done
under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of—subsection (2)(a) to the extent that the law in question imposes
upon a person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular
facts.”). Id. at § 77(12)(a)
147 See Murungaru II, at *32 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (discussing the
fairness of a trial in which constitutional guarantees are not met).
148 Peter Schroth, National and International Constitutional Law Aspects of African
Treaties and Laws against Corruption, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 95–
103 (2003) (discussing the constitutional concerns that arise with legislation, such
as the Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, that sweeps broadly in
an attempt to wipe out illegal behavior).
149 This contract was with a company called Nedemar Technology BV and
was for the creation of Project Nexus.
150 See KACC Stopped from Seeking the Identity of ‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firms, supra
note 142, at2 (discussing First Mercantile’s claims against KACC).
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4.7. Separation of Powers Issues
In Gachiengo v. Republic,151 the High Court held that the
appointment of a Judge to head the precursor to the Kenya AntiCorruption Commission, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority,
was a violation of the constitutional requirement of separation of
powers.152 The court also held that the power to undertake
criminal prosecutions in Kenya was exclusively vested in the
Attorney General, and for Parliament to the Kenya AntiCorruption Authority such prosecutorial power was a violation of
the Constitution. When this decision came down, the cases were
pending against a Cabinet Minister, a former Permanent Secretary
and a former Town Clerk of the City of Nairobi – all powerful and
connected persons at the time.153 Soon after this case, the
The Kenya Anti-Corruption
Authority was disbanded.154
Commission was established thereafter.
The Gachiengo, Saitoti and Ng’eny cases all demonstrate the
paradoxical nature of the relationship between human rights and
corruption. While it is often assumed that respect for human rights
can help in combating corruption, it is also true that those who
stand to lose most from the exposure of corruption are also more
likely to seek to defend and vindicate their rights in the judiciary.
Thus, human rights play a paradoxical role in relation to the fight
against corruption—they help to expose corruption but also give
those charged with corruption offenses opportunities to defend
their due process rights in the criminal justice system. In a
judiciary like Kenya’s, where rules and rights are often defended as
process rights, powerful individuals benefit from having to defend
their cases because courts are unlikely to closely scrutinize the
totality of the circumstances that result in charges taking too long
151 Gachiengo v. Republic, petition 302 of 2000 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi
Dec. 22, 2000) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (sitting as a Constitutional
Court).
152 See Schroth, supra note 148, at 92; MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 4
(citing argument from Gachiengo case where defendants argues that it was
contrary to the principle of separation of power for a judge to preside over a
corporate prosecutorial body).
153 These were Kigng’eno arap N’geny, Wilfred Kimalat, and Zipporah
Wandera respectively. See MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 8.
154 See SCHROTH, supra note 148, at 92 (noting that the Kenyan government
took advantage of the court’s ruling in Gachiengo, which held it unconstitutional
for a judge to hold the position of high commissioner of the anti-corruption
commission, to disband the commission even though disbandment was not
required by the court); MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 12.
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to reach the courts. Defendants also benefit from the lack of
political will that underlies many half-hearted attempts to
prosecute high-level corruption suspects.
For example, in Ng’eny the court prohibited the Attorney
General from bringing charges against a powerful government
minister on the grounds that the charges were flimsy, even though
they alleged that the Minister had caused losses to a public
corporation amounting to over 180 million Kenyan Shillings. The
Ng’eny court’s holding must also been seen as an example of the
ability of a well-heeled defense attorney to legally impugn a legal
order that is generally inefficient and slow—a quality that benefits
the wealthy but is unlikely to operate favorably towards the
thousands of prisoners held for years in custody while awaiting
trial or an appeal.155 Seen in this broader context, the Saitoti and
Ng’eny decisions begin to look more like a travesty of justice than
otherwise. Similarly, in the Murungaru case, the Court of Appeal
ordered the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission not to implement
and enforce a notice to Minister Chris Murungaru asking him to
declare his wealth under the Anti-Corruption and Economic
Crimes Act of 2003.156 In a remarkable reversal of the Ng’eny and
Saitoti tradition, the High Court dismissed the challenge made in
Murungaru to the constitutionality of the power of given to the
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission to require people reasonably
suspected of corruption to provide statements and records of how
they acquired their property. Unlike in Saitoti and Ng’eny, in
Murungaru the High Court held that these powers were
constitutionally justified and necessary intrusions into the lives of
those suspected of having engaged in corruption.157 This judgment
differed fundamentally from that of the Court of Appeal, which
MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16.
See Murungary v. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (Murungaru I),
petition 43 of 2006, at *13 (Ct. of App. At Nairobi Mar 24, 2006) (Elec. Kenyan L.
Rep., Case Search) (ordering a stay of implementation of the notice requesting
Murungaro to declare his wealth pending an adjudication on the constitutionality
of the note in the High Court).
157 See Murungaru II, at *42 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (holding that it
was not a violation of Murungaru’s constitutional rights to enforce a note
requesting him to declare his wealth). In the same tradition as Murungaru is
Meme v. Republic, (2004) 1 K.L.R. 637 (High Ct.) (Kenya). In circumstances
analogous to those in Saitoti, Ngeny and Murungaru, the High Court in Meme
decided that a constitutional challenge to trial in the Anti-Corruption courts was
unfounded and would not deny the defendant his right to presumption of
innocence. Id. at 691.
155
156
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had initially barred the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission from
implementing and enforcing a notice to have Murungaru, a former
powerful Minister in the Kibaki government, disclose his wealth
and its sources. The Court of Appeal had noted in its decision that
it had a duty to protect everyone’s rights even if they had fallen
from grace.
Perhaps most discouragingly for human rights advocates
interested in rooting-out corruption, the Ng’eny, Saitoti and
Gachiengo cases demonstrate that Kenyan law itself is deeply
implicated in producing corruption.158 For example, in the Saitoti
case, the Court referred to the manner in which the alleged corrupt
payments that resulted in the charges against Saitoti were legally
mandated under a law passed by Parliament and the payments
were endorsed in an international agreement between Kenya and
the International Monetary Fund that the Court found Kenya was
obliged to comply with under International Law.
4.7. Impunity as A Result of Rights Based Attacks on Prosecution of
Corruption Cases
In 2003 then powerful Minister of Energy Kiraitu Murungi,
who was a well-known human rights lawyer and campaigner
before he joined government, argued that it was perhaps time to
draw a line in the sand and forget and forgive all corruption
offenders from the past.159 In his view, it was becoming too
expensive and cumbersome to investigate and prosecute those
158 The view that Kenyan Law has sometimes helped fuel corruption has also
been taken with regard to laws and acts passed by the Executive Branch. KENYA
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMM’N & ASS’N OF PROF’L SOCIETIES IN E. AFR., A REPORT OF THE
JOINT WORKSHOP ON GOVERNANCE, ETHICS AND INTEGRITY AMONG PROFESSIONALS
5TH–6TH OCTOBER, 2006, 18 (2006) (observing that the proper approval process for
projects is “lengthy and bureaucratic” and managed by many uncoordinated,
uncontrolled regulatory boards). See also Abiya Ochola, Some Laws Enhance
Corruption— Report, THE STANDARD (Nairobi), July 28, 2007, at 11.
159 This was not the first time Kiraitu was expressing such views. See Kiraitu
Murungi, Putting the Past to Rest: The Dilemmas of Prosecution and Amnesty in the
Fight Against Corruption (unpublished paper). Here, in a paper prepared to
generate debate for Transparency International (Kenya), Kiraitu argued that “[n]o
effective anti-corruption strategy can be put in place in the present context as it
would threaten those in power.” Id. at 7. This argument was made when
President Moi was still in power. His argument, made in 2003, was that the cost
of prosecution outweighed the benefits of prosecution were made when he was a
powerful Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. However, in 2006, he
resigned in the face of the Anglo-Leasing Corruption scandal in which he was
implicated.
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cases. Time and scarce resources were being expended to
investigate cases where the trail of evidence had gone cold.
According to Murungi, the value added in the fight against
corruption was seen more as retribution against President Moi and
his cronies by the Kibaki government. Kiraitu was himself the
subject of a corruption investigation, and as such his suggestion
that the fight against corruption should focus on future and not
previous cases was correctly viewed as a self-serving argument.
Kiraitu’s exasperation could not also be matched by the
declaration of the Kibaki government to have a zero-tolerance for
corruption. This exasperation about the inability of the courts to
prosecute corruption cases was in large measure frustrated by the
use of constitutional challenges to corruption investigations and
prosecutions for violating the rights of those accused. While the
Bill of Rights of the Kenyan Constitution had been declared
inoperative in the 1980s, in the decade beginning in 2000, the
judiciary rediscovered it particularly as a weapon of choice by
those who could afford well lawyers to make their case. As such,
rights claims that stood no chance of checking the dictatorial oneparty era of President Moi experienced resurgence as noted above
in the discussion of the Saitoti and Ng’eny cases. Gone was the
deference to the government that characterized the predominant
judicial temperament of the 1980s and 1990s.
While Kiraitu’s objection grew out of his exasperation with
fighting old corruption cases, Justice Aaron Ringera, the Director of
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, has recently argued in
favor of limiting prosecution of old corruption cases on grounds
similar to the equitable doctrine of laches—this time not to delay
bringing cases such as those the Ng’eny court found
unconstitutional, but on the fact that there was a limitation of
bringing cases under Kenya’s corruption laws.
According to Ringera, Kenya’s Limitations of Actions Act does
not allow for the recovery of such monies and property six years
after the date of the commission of the offence.160 Justice Ringera
asserted that the Commission’s work of recovering stolen assets
and monies locally and abroad was limited by the statute of
limitations in this law,, which prohibits recovery six years after
cases involving breach of trust, fraud, and the looting currently
prohibited by the Economic Crimes Act, the Anti-Corruption Act,
160 See Lawyers Fault KACC’s Stand on Looted Public Funds, SUNDAY NATION
(Nairobi), June 3, 2007, at 7.
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and the Penal Code. He also argued that the Limitations of Actions
Act does not permit the pursuit of theft cases after three years. 161
Justice Ringera’s assertions on the interpretation of the
Limitations of Actions Act are challengeable on a number of valid
legal bases. First, the Limitation of Actions Act has an exception.
This means that the statutorily imposed limit to prosecute a
corruption case, or to pursue stolen monies and property, are not
necessarily, or even strictly, subject to the six-year period he cited.
That exception provides that the limitation period may be
extended.162
Justice Ringera’s interpretation of Kenyan law
inconsistently with the Commission’s declared objective of zerotolerance on corruption seemed strikingly similar to the
jurisprudence of the High Court in the Ng’eny, Saitoti and
Gachiengo cases as well as to Kiraitu’s proposal to end investigation
and prosecution of corruption cases. Thus, there has been a
convergence in High Court cases as well as the statements of
highly placed government officials that has tended to acquiesce to
high-level corruption.
One of the consequences of this acquiescence to high-level
corruption cases has been a culture of impunity. Highly placed
and well-connected Kenyans interpret the inability to prosecute
and to hold accountable corrupt individuals in the country as a
license to engage in further corruption. Clearly, anger and
frustration in the public about corruption and the way it has
siphoned off public resources at the expense of certain
communities was one of the underlying issues that contributed to
post-election violence.163 As noted above, the Waki Commission
161 See id. Whether or not this is actually the case, however, has been debated
as the Law Society of Kenya disagrees with Mr. Ringera’s assessment.
162 The power to extend the limitation period is contemplated by the
Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Chapter 2 of the Laws of Kenya.
Section 59 of Chapter 2 provides that:

[w]here in a written law a time is prescribed for doing an act or taking a
proceeding, and power is given to a court or other authority to extend
that time, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be
exercised by the court or other authority although the application for
extension is not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed.
The Interpretation and General Provisions Act, (2007) Cap. 2 § 59. (Kenya).
163 See KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ON THE BRINK OF THE
PRECIPICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNT OF KENYA’S POST-2007 ELECTION VIOLENCE
17–25 (2008) (noting that corruption, particularly regarding land allocation has
long plagued Kenyans, who had hoped to elect political leaders to tackle the
problem).
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on Post-Election Violence also attributed the violence to the culture
of impunity in the country.164 An opportunity to address impunity
squarely was lost early in the Kibaki administration when it
rejected the recommendation of a task force for the establishment
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The broad-ranging
powers the Commission would have wielded were feared to be
inconsistent with the Kibaki administration’s decision not to
reopen abuses of the Moi regime.165 The most definitive evidence
of the lack of commitment on the part of the Kibaki government in
its self-declared war on corruption was the resignation of John
Githongo as Permanent Secretary in Charge of Governance and
Ethics and his decision to leave the country because of threats to
his life. Githongo’s investigations exposed how senior members of
the Kibaki government had engaged in corrupt schemes of
government procurement variously dubbed the Anglo-Leasing
scandal.166 According to Githongo’s dossier, Anglo Leasing and
Finance Company, a company whose incorporation could not be
traced anywhere in the world, had routinely been awarded huge
defense and security contracts and that well-connected individuals
were receiving huge kickbacks as a result.167
4.8. Minority Rights and Safeguards for Minority Communities
Kenya’s independence Constitution was designed to safeguard
rights of minority ethnic communities in a variety of ways. First,
there was the regional system of government that created regional
legislative assemblies and a system of distribution of resources
from the central to the regions. Second, there was a Senate in
addition to a House of Representatives that had representation
from the regions. Most importantly, this system of protection of
rights of minority communities was specially entrenched in the
See WAKI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 443–45.
For the Task Force Report, see Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the
Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15 (2004) (recommending the creation of a Truth
Commission and suggesting the matters it should investigate and the manner in
which it should be organized in detail).
166 See MARS GROUP KENYA, GAP REPORT NO. 2, ILLEGALLY BINDING: THE
MISSING ANGLO-LEASING SCANDAL PROMISSORY NOTES 25–29 (2007) (providing a
full report on the scandal, including information from John Githongo), available at
http://publications.marsgroupkenya.org/GAP_Report2_Passports/GAP2
_Report_Web_Version.pdf
167 Id.
164
165
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Constitution. However, these protections were quickly eroded
with extensive constitutional amendments such that by the end of
the 1960s, Kenya had a heavily centralized political system with a
President whose powers were almost un-limitable.168 President
Kenyatta and President Moi maintained political power by using
their patronage over state resources and appointments of key
representatives of various ethnic communities to government
positions.169
Post-independence governments put a heavy
premium on having as much political power as they could and
argued that this was necessary, as any alternative arrangement
would impede the rapid realization of national goals. In the 1980s,
when privatization reduced opportunities for patronage within the
government, giving land to political favorites became a major
source of patronage. The attendant corruption that resulted from
irregular and illegal allocations of land was the subject of two
major government appointed commissions.170
The illegal and irregular allocation of land and the lack of
effective voice in the political system by ethnic communities,
particularly in the Rift Valley, resulted in grievances over land
issues that formed a critical backdrop against which the violence
that followed the 2007 elections happened. This has been
particularly so for small indigenous communities like the Ogiek of
the Mau forest who brought suit in the High Court in 1992 for
168 See Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 4–5 (outlining
constitutional amendments that served to increase the presidential power by
outlawing all opposing political parties and giving the president the power to fire
judges and civil servants).
169 Id. at 4–5 (“the executive branch . . . wield[s] considerable control over the
judicial and legislative branches of government through a system of patronage
and threats”); cf. Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.B. MCAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 514–16 (1970) (charging that the safeguards
established by the Kenyan Constitution have been whittled down and used by
ministers to maintain political support); see generally Y.P. Ghai, Independence and
Safeguards in Kenya, 3 E. AFR. L.J. 177 (1967) (explaining the development and
importance of provisions in the constitution to safe guard specific regional ethnic
communities and their weaknesses).
170 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ILLEGAL/IRREGULAR
ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC LAND (2004) (reporting the results of the commission to
investigate corrupt allocation of public land, identify specific instances of
corruption, and suggest remedies); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
LAND LAW SYSTEM OF KENYA ON PRINCIPLES OF A NATIONAL LAND POLICY
FRAMEWORK, CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF LAND AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION (2002) (reporting the results of the
commission to survey national land relations and propose a national Land Policy).
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being unlawfully evicted from the Tinet forest.171 The Ogiek
claimed that their eviction from their land violated their right to an
ancestral home and their right to a livelihood consistent with their
rights. The High Court dismissed their case, ruling that the
eviction was neither discriminatory nor illegal or unconstitutional.
The attitude of the High Court in this and similar cases exemplifies
the government’s lack of responsiveness to claims of minority and
indigenous communities. In addition, the Kenyan government
abstained from supporting the adoption of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Indigenous Peoples172 in September 2007, further
indicating its unwillingness to confront the question of indigenous
communities in the country.
One of the most contentious issues prior to the vote on the
referendum for a new proposed Constitution in Kenya was
whether there ought to be a regional system of government as a
safeguard against abuse of minority rights. This debate indicated
the extent to which safeguards would give minority communities
in the country a voice within the government. Conversations
continue as to whether these regional arrangements could check
governmental abuses of power such as the illegal and irregular
allocations of land as well as expulsions of indigenous
communities from their homes. Regional governments would also
reduce the discretion and attendant corruption often associated
with a centralized government.
4.9. Social and Economic Rights and the Anti-Corruption Agenda
Social and economic rights include the rights to education,173
work174 and health.175 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, in
emphasizing the importance of social and economic rights, have
argued that any approach to human rights which “finds no place
for a right of access to primary healthcare [] is [] flawed in terms
both of the theory of human rights and of United Nations

171 Kemai v. Attorney Gen., Civil Case 238 of 1999 (High Ct. of Kenya at
Nairobi Mar. 23, 2000) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search).
172 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007).
173 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR],
art. 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
174 Id. art. 6.
175 Id. art. 12.
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doctrine.”176 Indeed, the Committee on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights notes that the right to health under Article 12 (2) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”):
embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that
promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life,
and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such
as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable
water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working
conditions, and a healthy environment.177
This definition falls in the second positive and expansive definition
of the right to health which in turn implicates obligations on states
to ensure “equality, equity, well-being, fairness, and justice in
reforming health systems—reducing disparities, respecting difference,
and eliminating inequities in health worldwide.”178
However, corruption often depletes resources that would
otherwise go to fund access to adequate healthcare facilities,
equipment, supplies and personnel as well as to the underlying
determinants of good health including food, housing and safe
potable water.
Thus, corruption undermines the ability of
governments not merely to meet their citizens’ wants and needs,
but rather their social and economic rights. In the 1970s,
international lawyers began to advocate for what were previously
thought of as needs and wants in terms of rights. By substituting
rights for needs, they sought to transform the concept of needs into
one of legal entitlement. For these lawyers, to assert that a
particular social claim or need was a human right was to “vest it
emotionally and morally with an especially high degree of
legitimacy.”179
However, this novel strategy, developed in the Cold War
context of the 1970s, was met with the rebuttal that social and
176 Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom,
Jus Cogens and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 95 (1992).
177 U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], COMM. ON ECON., SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health: 11/08/2000,
CESR Gen. Comment 14, ¶4, U.N.DOC. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
178 The Global Assembly on Advancing the Human Right to Health, Iowa
City, Iowa Apr. 20-22, 2001, The Iowa City Appeal on Advancing the Human Right to
Health, 2 (Apr. 22, 2001).
179 Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic
Questions, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 171, 174 (1969).
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economic rights were not justiciable or enforceable in court.
Opponents argued that social and economic rights were vague and
imprecise that they did not establish imperatives that could be
enforced by a court of law in the same way that civil and political
rights do. This vagueness, they argued, was evidenced in the
language of the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights (“ICSECR”). For example, states are required to
recognize the rights to work, health, education, social security, an
adequate standard of living, just and favorable conditions of work,
and participation in and enjoyment of the fruits of culture and
science. By contrast, in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), rights are declared. Similarly, the
ICSECR directs parties to undertake to ensure a right; whereas rights
in the ICCPR are declared and ensured rather than recognized.
In addition to lacking concrete social and economic rights, the
ICESCR failed to make social and economic rights subject to the
immediate realization to which the ICCPR was subject, instead
adopting a standard of progressive realization.
A further
limitation of the ICESCR is that it only requires states to undertake
these steps to the maximum of their available resources.180 In its
General Comments, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, has clarified the legal obligations that state parties
have against the backdrop of references to progressive realization
and to maximum available resources. Hence, it has observed that the
concept of progressive realization “should not be misinterpreted as
depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the one
hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the
real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights.”181 The
reference to maximum available resources can only be invoked if a
state can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a
matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”182 The Committee
has also concluded that the ICESCR requires every state party to
ensure the satisfaction of a minimum core obligation of “at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights.”183
ICESCR, supra note 173, at art. 2(1).
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Nature of States
Parties Obligations ¶ 9, U.N.DOC. E/1991/23 (Dec. 12, 1990).
182 Id. ¶ 10.
183 Id.
180
181
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In 1993, the United Nations Vienna Conference on Human
Rights
categorically
recognized
the
indivisibility
and
interdependence between social and economic rights on the one
hand, and civil and political rights on the other.184 Since then, there
has been an increasing commitment to the recognition of the
interdependence between social and economic rights and civil and
political rights.185
The impact of corruption on social and economic rights is
illustrated in the following example. In May 2006, a courageous
Kenyan who had blown the whistle on corruption in relation to a
government sponsored, low-cost housing scheme was shot.
Luckily, the shots were not fatal.186 In this corruption case, senior
government officials, politicians and their aides had been
irregularly allocated several housing units intended to benefit poor
Kenyans living in the informal Majengo area of Nairobi. This
corruption scandal shows that even when the government actually
gets to spend money on social programs to benefit the poor, there
is a real possibility of such projects being hijacked by well to do.
This and many other cases demonstrate the importance of an
understanding of human rights that integrates both civil and
political rights and social and economic rights. The fight against
corruption is, at the end of the day, a fight for all human rights.
4.10. Conclusions: Transforming the Anti-Corruption Agenda Using
Rights
Two conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of the
relationship between corruption and human rights. First, in the
context of Kenya, the relationship between corruption and human
rights has been ambiguous. That is to say, the Bill of Rights has
largely been used by well-heeled lawyers asserting due process
claims to defend persons accused of high-level corruption. The
fact that Kenyan courts have acquiesced to these arguments in
184 See
Shadrack B.O. Gutto, Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of
Implementing/Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 79, 87–88 (1998) (discussing the problems associated with unequal
approaches to the protection of human rights based on their categorical
grouping).
185 See generally Craig Scott, Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category
of ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21 HUM, RTS. Q. 633 (1999) (providing indepth analysis of the implications of categorical grouping of human rights).
186 Ayub Savula & Cyprus Ombati, Whistle Blower Shot After Exposing Scam,
THE STANDARD (Nairobi), May 25, 2006, at 36.
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leading cases has greatly hampered the prosecution of corrupt
officials, especially those associated with high-level corruption.
A second conclusion is that corruption has undermined respect
for human rights within the country. For example, the Committee
on the Rights of the Child has recognized a connection between
Kenya’s inability to adhere to its obligations under that the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and corruption in the
country.
These conclusions are unsurprising given that the essential
nature of the Kenyan State as well as its Constitution have
remained intact and unchanged for several decades now. The
Kenyan State is highly centralized in the Presidency, who has
enormous power under the Constitution. This has resulted in a
high stakes politics because the Constitution establishes a winnertakes-all system in which the losing political parties are excluded
not only from political power, but from other State benefits, upon
conceding defeat.
An effort to undertake citizen driven
comprehensive constitutional reforms that would have radically
democratized the political and economic nature of the Kenyan
State was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons in a referendum in
2005.187
This analysis establishes for developing rights-based strategies
for addressing corruption within Kenya. It would be naïve to
simply assume that a revamped Bill of Rights would, in and of
itself, result in more vigorous prosecutions against corruption, in
light of the fact that the constitutional machinery designed to
combat corruption is itself corrupted. The following short list of
Constitutional reforms would begin the long road to truly
democratizing the Kenyan State and alleviating the effects of
corruption on Kenyan jurisprudence: (1) democratize the State by
reducing the powers of the Presidency in relation to the
Legislature, the Judiciary, as well as to Civil Society; (2) create an
independent, impartial and free judiciary that is a watchdog of the
human rights of all Kenyan citizens; (3) draft a Bill of Rights that
guarantees civil and political rights, social and economic rights,
187 See James Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing and
Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1111 (2008)
(discussing the unsuccessful Constitutional reform in 2005). For a discussion of
the origins of comprehensive and citizen driven constitutional reform aimed at
fundamental reform to change the political and economic structure of the country
see WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND
TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA, 1992-1997 (1999).
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rights of children, women, minorities as well as the disabled; and
(4) make a fair land policy that is free of corruption and makes
land available to all.
Human rights will remain important on the journey to
democratizing the Kenyan state, just as they were in other contexts,
such as South Africa.188 Freedom of expression, for example, will
continue to be crucial in exposing corruption to public scrutiny.
The government’s effort to cover up corruption has been less
successful in recent years. Today, Kenyans have access to
information from multiple radio and television outlets, unlike in
the days of a single government-run radio and television station.
Additionally, there continues to be a vibrant mainstream and
alternative press with a variety of daily, weekly and monthly
newspapers. Many of these have websites which publish most, if
not all, the contents of their hardcopy papers. Furthermore,
Kenyans can access information about corruption within the
country through Internet sources based outside the country. For
example, a dossier on corruption scandals in the Kibaki
government was released by former Governance and Ethics
Permanent Secretary John Githongo on an Internet site in 2005.189
The anti-corruption agenda will only be transformed when the
range of human rights concerns are expanded. The Ng’eny and
Saitoti decisions were individualized claims of rights violations.
However, if we understand corruption as nationwide problem,
disabling the government from meeting the millions of Kenyans’
rights to health, education and housing, we can start to address
injustices at a much broader and generalized level. The category of
human rights violations should be expanded to cover women,
children, minorities and the disabled. A broader conception of
188 See Makau Wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of
Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 63 (1997) ("[T]he democratic rebirth of
the South African state . . . has arguably been the most historic event in the human
rights movement . . . .”); see also Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative
Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146, 151 (1998) (arguing that South Africa
has “adopted a postliberal constitution, one that may be read not only as open to
but committed to large-scale egalitarianism social transformation”).
189 John Githongo was a Permanent Secretary in Charge of Governance and
Ethics in the Kibaki government. The dossier contained his findings on his
investigations which he submitted to the President. He resigned from his position
towards the end of 2005 following threats on his life by senior members of the
government whom he was investigating. The Project KTM Consolidated Report,
dated April 27th, 2004, also known as the “Kroll Report,” revealing a trail of
corruption scandals from the Moi to the Kibaki government was also released
online.
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rights is in light of the finding of John Githongo that both the Moi
and Kibaki governments established fictitious companies, which
were in turn paid billions of U.S. dollars for ostensible defense and
security contracts. While this money enriched a few individuals
and helped to finance their political incumbency, millions of
Kenyans were deprived of resources that would have financed
programs of public education, health, housing and water, among
other services.
In short, the Ng’eny and Saitoti decisions reflect not only the
fact that the Kenyan Constitution protects civil and political rights
at the expense of social and economic rights, but also that if this
continues, the full democratization of the Kenyan State will never
be realized. The protection of civil and political rights without
simultaneously protecting and safeguarding a minimal core of the
social and economic rights of a majority of the population is
insufficient to protect the rights of all Kenyans.
Yet there is another tradition in the legal system that has given
a different, and perhaps more hopeful interpretation, of anticorruption statutes. In the Murungaru decision, the High Court
ignored the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions by holding constitional the
Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority’s power to seek information
from a corruption suspect. Instead, the High Court noted:
[T]he massive and debilitating cancerous nature of
corruption in Kenya has impoverished and continues to
impoverish the great majority of the Kenyan masses and
leads to robbing the government of resources to build and
maintain a run-down infrastructure, inadequate health
services and mediocre and inadequate educational facilities.
It has led to spiral inflation and unemployment.190
Though this was a stunning departure from the narrowly
legalistic route followed by the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions, the
need to broaden the scope of rights implicated by corruption
remains an important agenda.
Additionally, it must be
accompanied by efforts to make the President accountable. If, as
the Githongo dossier revealed, the architects of massive corruption
schemes in the government were unconcerned that Githongo
would report their corruption scheme to the President, then grand
corruption has no real check. That is why an effective battle
190

Murungaru II, at *82 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search).
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against corruption must be accompanied by broad based
constitutional reform to decentralize executive power and to make
it more accountable to Parliament, the judiciary and, therefore, to
the People.
5.

DISTRIBUTIONAL AND FAIRNESS ISSUES ARISING FROM A FOCUS
ON GRAND VERSUS PETTY CORRUPTION

5.1. Introduction
This Section explores how anti-corruption and judicial reform
initiatives impact the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged in
African countries. I make two primary claims. First, I show that
judicial reform initiatives give priority to facilitating the
implementation of market reforms to ensure that investors can
enforce their rights at the lowest cost and within the shortest time.
By contrast, there is little or no effort to ensure access to courts,
lower costs or shortening the time period within which the poor,
the marginalized and the disadvantaged can similarly enforce their
rights within the judicial system. For example, large numbers of
the incarcerated poor go without a fair trial or even access to the
judicial system to enforce their rights.191 On the other hand, the
rights of investors are protected by the government through largescale legal reform efforts.
Second, I show that anti-corruption reforms privilege investors,
making it easier for them to do business, rather than address the
problems related to corruption that are faced by the poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged.
For example, while petty
corruption affects the poor disproportionately—as when the police
enforce city ordinances to shut down or demolish informal openair markets192—it seems to get less attention from reformers in both
the public and non-governmental sectors. By contrast, when there
is grand corruption or theft of public resources—as when bribes
are involved in contact bids by foreign corporations—the outcry is
bigger than when petty corruption affects the poor’s ability to get
access to government services, enroll in vocational and teacher
training colleges supported by the state or obtain employment in
the private sector. Of course, my argument is not that grand
191 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 41-42 (discussing
vulnerable groups and the right to fair trial).
192 See Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 20–21.
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corruption does not negatively affect the poor. Rather, my claim is
that petty corruption disproportionately affects the poor and yet it
is seldom the focus of attention in anti-corruption reform
initiatives.
In my conclusions, I argue that efforts to address issues of
poverty primarily through market-centered reforms that foreclose
addressing questions of inequality and injustice193 can be reframed
to alleviate the conditions of the poor, by making these central
goals in economic and judicial reform. The problem with current
economic and legal reform initiatives is that issues of inequality
and injustice are not regarded as integral issues. These reform
programs seek to deal with inequality and injustice indirectly not
through public spending, but rather through the trickle down
effects of private investment.194 Thus a fundamental problem with
current approaches to addressing the of challenges posed by
poverty is that they discourage and discredit such public
spending.195 By shunning traditional tax and transfer mechanisms,
market- based approaches addressing issues of poverty are also
disproportionately injurious to women.196
First, I will study the effects corruption has on the poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged. I will next examine the ways in
which judicial reform initiatives are designed to favor the interests
of investors. Finally, I will show that judicial and anti-corruption
reform projects as presently constituted do little or nothing to
promote the interests of the poor, marginalized and
disadvantaged. In my conclusion, I briefly outline how to ensure
that anti-corruption, judicial and investment reforms can be
193 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY 61–72, 189–200 (2000) (discussing market reform to be more responsive to
poor populations).
194 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy, and Human Rights: The
Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495, 503 (1999) (arguing that this is
due in large part to the self-serving interests of western countries and NGOs who
seek to further advance themselves through anti-corruption initiatives in
developing countries).
195 See James Thuo Gathii, A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of
Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, 13
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 181 (2003) (criticizing the NEPAD as a
capitalist vision of a market-centered development plan that does not take in to
consideration the uniqueness of African nations’ economic situations).
196 See Kerry Rittich, Engendering Development/Marketing Equality, 67 ALB. L.
REV. 575, 593 (2003) (explaining the need to include gender equality as a variable
when creating economic development plans).
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structured to provide for market efficiency without neglecting the
needs of the poor.
5.2. How Corruption Affects the Poor, Marginalized and
Disadvantaged
While corruption had become a central tenet of the good
governance agenda by the mid-1990s, the primary focus of the anticorruption agenda has been to reduce its impact on private
investment. Far less attention has been paid to the impact of
corruption on those who suffer most from its consequences—the
poor, marginalized and disadvantaged. For example, corruption is
directly correlated to poor educational achievement in African
countries.197 The poor and the disadvantaged rely heavily on the
public educational system to educate their children. Education is
often the surest path out of poverty. Yet the educational systems in
many African countries are adversely affected by corruption.
Corruption in the educational system of many of these countries
commonly takes the form of bribery as a precondition to admitting
students.198
Other types of low-level corruption include
government clerks taking money for petty bureaucratic matters
such as processing educational transcripts and certificates; officials
taking bribes in return for staff recruitment and promotion; and
money changing hands at different stages of government
procurement.199 There are also examples of teachers bribing
government officials to transfer them from schools located in poor
areas where roads are inaccessible and amenities like piped water
and electricity are hard to come by. Unfortunately, the areas that
are hit hardest by poverty, are almost those most in need of quality
teachers.
It is clear that petty corruption imposes high costs on the poor,
in particular. The poor have to contend not only with inadequate
197 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 56–57 (explaining the
impact of corruption on education).
198 See Terracino, supra note 1, at 27–31 (noting that many parents have to
bribe educators or become involved in corruption in other ways to obtain
education for their children).
199 See Dilip Parajuli, What is Driving Educational Ineffectiveness in Kenya? The
Role of Economic Inefficiency, Institutional Corruption and Poverty 7 (2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Transparency International-Kenya)
(outlining these different forms of corruption); see also Corruption and Human
Rights, supra note 1, at 31–58 (providing an in depth look at various types of low
level corruption and how each affects the human rights of citizens in particularly
the poor).
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service provisioning, but also have to make “payments” for the
delivery of even the most basic government activity, such as the
issuing of official documentation.200 In many countries, applicants
for a national identification card, a driver’s licenses, building
permits and other routine documents have learned to expect a
“surcharge” from civil servants. In such cases, civil servants such
as nurses, members of the military, policemen, guards, and custom
officers constantly pressure poorer farmers and merchants to come
up with bribes. A study by the Index of Economic Freedom found
an increase in corruption by low ranking officials in Algeria,
Lebanon and Tunisia and claims that petty corruption rises as real
incomes fall because “public servants attempt to compensate for
the loss in purchasing power by demanding more bribes.”201
Petty corruption is not usually the primary target of anticorruption reforms.202 Even when it is, the Kenyan government is
reluctant to address the inadequate compensation of officers,
encouraging this corruption to fester. Together, petty corruption
constitutes the government’s entire commitment to fighting
corruption and is achieved through the prosecution of only lowlevel officers.203 Thus, while big level corruption is generally the
focus of most anti-corruption initiatives, prosecution of low-level
government officials engaging in petty corruption occurs more
200 See Parajuli, supra note 199, at 5–7 (linking inefficiencies in the educational
system in Kenya with corruption); see also TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL KENYA,
THE KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 2008 11 (2008), available at http://www.tikenya.org
/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf [hereinafter KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 2008]
(finding that 76% of the Kenyans surveyed had been forced to pay a bribe in the
past year).
201 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 203–14
(2003) (reporting that although grand corruption had fallen in the Middle East
and North Africa in 2001–2002, petty corruption had risen); see also UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON THE
HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 18–19 (2004) (finding that
policemen in Indonesia, who are notoriously badly paid, will often arrest people
for the purpose of seeking bribes and compensation from them).
202 See Stephen Mburu, After Ringera, Focus Now on Wako, SUNDAY NATION
(Nairobi), Oct. 3, 2009 (alluding to the fact that ‘big fish’ were hardly prosecuted
under Ringera’s reign as Director of the Kenyan Anti Corruption Authority),
available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/667428/-/xu9jifz//index.html.
203 But see Press Release, The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, Press
Statement On the Performance of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, (Sept.
18, 2007) (defending the Kenya Anti-Corruptions Commission efforts to eradicate
all forma of corruption, not just that of “small-fish”), available at
http://www.kacc.go.ke/archives/pressreleases/performance-statement.pdf.
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often because such officials can be easily prosecuted without fear
of major political fallout.204 Petty corruption is responsible for
huge sums of money changing hands because the many rivulets of
petty corruption may add up to a mighty stream of corruption.
Estimates today put global petty corruption in the hundreds of
billions of dollars annually.205
5.2.1.

Education

A Transparency International bribery survey of over 2000
Kenyans showed that average citizens paid $175 to obtain access to
government services.206 Corruption, therefore, undercuts the
provision of public services such as healthcare, education,
transportation and local policing.207 Since the poor have fewer
resources of their own, they are more likely to rely on such
government services and are therefore susceptible to being
disproportionately affected when these services are unavailable
because of corruption or are only available at a surcharge they
204 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 201,
at 31–32 (questioning the success of the anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong
because the government has only prosecuted low-level corruption and has not
prosecuted any high officials since 1992).
205 See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery:
Expanding the scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employer, 46 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 425, 427–28 (2009) (stating that forty to sixty of the 240 to 300 billion
dollars lost in corruption annually is through bribery and petty corruption); A
First Estimate of Petty Corruption, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dec. 20, 2002, (stating
that petty corruption in India is nearly 27 billion core annually), available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/a-first-estimate-of-petty-corruption
/64987/#; Petty Corruption is a 45 Billion Rupee Industry in Pakistan, South Asia
News, Aug. 12, 2006 (relaying findings regarding corruption levels in Pakistan),
available at http://www.southasianews.com/NewsPrint.asp?nid=89207. But see
United Nations Development Programme, TACKLING CORRUPTION, TRANSFORMING
LIVES: ACCELERATING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 2 (2008)
(stating that corruption estimates are imprecise because they’re determined
through public opinion’s on bribery and not so much on reported instances),
available
at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/asiathepacific
/RHDR_Full%20Report_Tackling_Corruption_Transforming_Lives.pdf.
206 See KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 2008, supra note 200, at 10. But see TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, INTEGRITY CHECK 2003: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING
INTEGRITY IN THE NARC GOVERNMENT AND THE JUDICIARY (2003) (surveying public
opinion regarding the extent of corruption in government and finding that most
Kenyans are warily optimistic regarding corruption in their country), available at
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/Integritycheck.ppt.
207 See Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 1, at 3 (“Corruption hinders
the delivery of state services that individuals are entitled to, preventing the
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.”).
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cannot afford. According to the Center for Governance and
Development, the Kenyan government lost Ksh 475 billion through
corruption, negligence and wastefulness.”208 The “Education
[m]inistry alone wasted Ksh 33.9 billion—7.1% of total loss in the
same period, and ranks third among all the ministries behind the
President’s Office and Local Government. . . .”209 A “majority of
losses come from unrecovered university student loans and unsurrendered institutional grants.”210 These unrecovered or unsurrendered amounts are usually non-recoverable.211 The report
concluded that it could be “safely assumed that much of it is
already diverted to personal gain.”212
At the micro-level, the current 8-4-4 system of education in
Kenya tries to cover a wide range of subjects with extensive
contents, a task that is impossible to accomplish in the allotted
time.213 “This has led to out-of-school classes or ‘coaching’ where
teachers make money” by providing private tuition after school
hours.214 Private tuition has been converted into a “money-minting
enterprise.”215 Teachers “deliberately fail to cover the syllabus
during the normal school hours and wait to teach during the extra
hours to make a quick buck.”216 Of course, children from poor
homes cannot afford such extra costs of tuition. In addition, many
schools are dilapidated and ill-equipped.
5.2.2.

Health and Safety

The diversion of public resources, services and assets into
private use takes resources away from essential medical services
and contributes to deteriorating infrastructure that subsequently
affects the health and safety of the public and in particular the
208 Parajuli, supra, note 203 at 7 (citing CENTER FOR GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT, A SURVEY OF SEVEN YEARS OF WASTE: A STUDY OF CORRUPTION IN
KENYA BY THE CENTER FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, 2001 and Controller &
Auditor General reports, 1991–1996).
209 Parajuli, supra note 199, at 7.
210 Id. at 8.
211 See Parajuli, supra, note 199 at 8 (surmising that lost loans and grant are
very difficult to ever recover).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 9.
214 Id.; See also Bacio Terracino, supra note 1, at 27–30 (stating that this is a
problem in many developing nations struggling to reduce corruption).
215 Parajuli, supra note 199, at 9.
216 Id.
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poor. 217 Poor infrastructure, storage and maintenance at health
centers has lead to damaged or expired drugs, resulting in either
ineffective medical treatment or patients who do not have access to
the drugs they need.218 In Kenya, it has been reported that
corruption has resulted in “quacks” being given licenses to operate
clinics, resulting in deaths of patients.219 Widespread corruption
evidenced by diversion of public resources for private use
adversely affects new investment and economic growth.220 Bribery
and corruption also discourage new investors from countries with
corruption problems.221 Petty and grand corruption in Africa has
made East European countries more attractive foreign investment
destinations.222
Low foreign investment fails to increase
employment and therefore negatively impacts the poor by
depriving them of potential sources of income.223
Judicial reforms such as those promoted by the Asian
Development Bank have sought to ensure that foreign investment
will create employment for the poor. These reforms, though
primarily aimed at promoting the rule of law, have resulted “in the
twin goals of greater responsiveness to a market economy and
increasing the social access of the poor to public goods and
services.”224 Examples include projects in Vietnam, Mongolia, the
Terracino, supra note 1, at 27.
See Graft Messing up Health Services, THE EAST AFRICAN (Nairobi), June 4,
2007, at 6 (reporting on the many difficulties Uganda has getting health care to its
poor).
219 Emmanuel Micah Eldoret, Graft Reigns at Health Ministry, THE STANDARD
(Nairobi), June 27, 2007, at 8.
220 Victor E. Dike, Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control
(2000),
http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/gen
/corruptiondikehtm.html (“Corruption effects investment, economic growth, and
govern-ment [sic] expenditure choices; it also reduces private investment.”)
(internal citation omitted).
221 Id. (noting that corruption and other inefficiencies keep investors from
Nigeria).
222 Id. (“With the recent changes in the political economy of East Europe, the
attention of the business world has been turned to this area where they may reap
quicker results from their investments.”) (emphasis omitted).
223 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC and Corruption,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2009) (reporting the negative effects of corruption on economic development and
foreign investments).
224 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AN OVERVIEW OF ADB’S LAW AND POLICY
REFORM ACTIVITIES IN 2001 (2001), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents
/Others/Law_ADB/lpr_2001_Part_1.pdf; see generally ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON
217
218
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South Pacific, Nepal, Philippines and Maldives. The legal and
judicial reform in Pakistan for instance, which was done in
conjunction with the civil society, sought to strengthen systems of
administrative justice, and increase the use of local languages,
which it is hoped will allow the poor and marginalized to open the
door to legal remedies. Similar judicial reforms in Africa could do
well to borrow from this experience. However, as I will show
below, this has not been the case.
5.3. Judicial Reform Initiatives Are Designed to Favor the Interests of
Investors.
Recognizing that good governance is essential for market
economy, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank,
and the Asian Development Bank have since 1994 “approved or
initiated more than $500 million in loans for judicial reform
projects in 26 countries.”225 “Judicial reform is part of a larger
effort to make the legal systems in developing countries and
transition economies more market friendly.”226 The broader
scheme includes “everything from writing or revising commercial
codes, bankruptcy statutes, and company laws . . . [to] overhauling
regulatory agencies and teaching justice ministry officials how to
draft legislation that fosters private investment.”227 The specific
rationale underlying these projects is to reduce transaction costs for
investors.228 Transaction costs in the judiciary would be reduced in
the following ways: making the judicial branch independent229 by

PROPOSED
FOR THE

LOAN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM, available at http://www.abd.org
/documents/RRPS/PAL/rrp_32023.pdf (explaining that the goals of the AJP are
to “improve access to justice so as to . . . sec[ure] and sustain entitlements and
thereby reduce the poor’s vulnerability . . . and create conditions conducive to
pro-poor growth”).
225 See Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey
of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117 (1999).
226 Id. at 118.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 120–23 (describing the ways in which increased investment lead to
economic growth, the goal of the reform).
229 This is an important suggestion made by many Judicial Reform efforts
including the Kwach Report. See KENYA COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 10 (1998)
(noting that corruption “pervet[s] the course of justice” by causing the delay of
trials).
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insulating the selection of the Chief Justice,230 creating an
evaluation and disciplinary process to prevent improper
influence231 and allowing judges to control their own budget;232
speeding the processing of cases by providing management
training, computers, and other resources to judges and court
personnel;233 and increasing access to dispute resolution
mechanisms such as creating mediation and arbitration services.
These reforms would in turn reduce case backlogs and accelerate
the disposition of new disputes thus weeding out delay and
controlling costs.234
In this section, I will examine these reforms to strengthen the
judiciary to enable investors to invest with the lowest possible
number of restrictions. My purpose is to show that these reforms
are not primarily aimed at addressing the problems of corruption
faced by the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged. Rather they
are aimed at promoting the interests of the investors. In my view,
these reforms exacerbate the fact that judicial systems across Africa
were primarily designed to meet the demands of the business class
rather than to address large-scale issues of poverty and social
division. In fact, many governments in post-colonial Africa did
little or nothing to make the judicial system responsive to broad
segments of their population. Reforms to strengthen judiciaries at
230 This is, and always has been, an issue in Kenya as the President has long
been responsible for the selection of the Chief Justice, which led to very
unexpected and arguably unqualified appointments of Chief Justices such as
Chief Justice Chunga, who, it would seem, was not selected to the position based
on the merits of his resume. See JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT, ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
REFORM IN KENYA 1998–2003 57 (Ben Sihanya & Philip Kichana eds., 2004)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA, 1998-2003] (recounting the appointment of
Chief Justice Chunga).
231 This has also been an issue in Kenya in the past. There have recently been
more judicial reports such as the Ringera Report which published the names of
Justices who appear to be corrupt. However, even these widely approved reports
have been questioned to an extent because they were created, in part, by people
who were judges themselves and who therefore may have been in a position to
protect themselves or others close to them. Id. at 61–64.
232 KENYA COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 229, at 38–
39.
233 Id. at 29.
234 Kenya’s intention to remedy these problems can be seen in part through
the implementation of some of the measures suggested to it by the Kwach Report
including the reorganization of the courts to create Commercial Court, Family
Court, etc. and the creation of more Magistrate’s Courts in rural areas. Both of
these helped to improve the speed and delivery of justice to the Kenyan people.
See JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT, supra note 230.
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the moment are not primarily targeted towards making the legal
system broadly accessible and affordable for all, but mostly for
business interests. In my analysis, I will select a few illustrative
examples.
Economists have developed a hypothesis used to affirm the
judiciary’s effect in enabling exchanges between private parties.
Thomas Hobbes argued that a judicial system was necessary to
assure traders that their contracts would be honored.235 Twentieth
century economists have supported this with evidence to support
the argument that the absence of a judicial system results in high
transaction cost for those involved in business.236 Reformers give
the example of Ghana as a country in which the judiciary is unable
to enforce contractual obligations and businesses therefore have to
rely upon “a network of traders to serve as go-betweens.”237 In this
context, personal relationships provide the buyer and the seller
with some assurance that the goods will be delivered and payment
received. Economists argue that this comes with a price: the costs
of doing business are subsequently increased by the creation of
intermediaries.238
A broader hypothesis posits that market performance depends
upon a judicial or legal system in which contracts between private
parties are enforced and the property rights of foreign and
domestic investors are respected. The government in turn operates
within a known framework of rules in which the judiciary occupies
a unique position by holding the executive and legislative branches
accountable for their decisions to ensure the credibility of the
overall business and political environment thereby supporting
economic growth.
Today, the majority of developing countries and former
socialist states are receiving some type of assistance from
international organizations such as the U.N. and the World Bank to
undertake projects to help reform courts, prosecutors’ offices and
other institutions that together constitute the judicial system. A
significant and common objective of these projects is to ensure
investors to enforce their rights at the lowest cost and within the
See Messick, supra, note 225, at 120.
Id. (reviewing contemporary research on Hobbes’ hypothesis).
237 Id.
238 For a critical view of this view in the East Asian context, see John
Onhesorge, ‘Ratch’eting up the Anti-Corruption Drive: Could a Look at Recent History
Cure a Case of Theory-Determinism?, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 467 (1999).
235
236
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shortest duration of time. Thus, a primary aim of judicial and legal
reform in Sierra Leone is the creation of an enabling environment
for private sector investment. 239 Proceeding from the premise that
inadequacies in publicly provided judicial and legal services for
private sector transactions bring about costs and risks to private
investors and are thus a disincentive to private investment, the
government specifically made it an objective to reduce costs to
private investors in part by protecting their property rights,
enforcing contracts and enhancing their ability to obtain
information on legislation.240 In particular, its reform initiatives
include establishing an institutional process for legislative review,
developing a core work program for revising business and
commercial law, and enabling the cost-effective functioning of the
judiciary and the Department of Judicial Affairs. The project aims
at addressing the three sets of constraints that have been identified
as adversely affecting the quality, timeliness and cost-effectiveness
of judicial and legal services, namely: inadequacy of the law,
implementation of the law, and court infrastructure. The project
puts as its priority the legislative reform of business and
commerce, particularly to update and revise pertinent laws and
regulations governing business and commerce through the joint
efforts of the Law Reform Commission, Law Revision Committee,
and Law Reporting Council.
The Financial and Legal Management upgrading project
introduced by the World Bank in Tanzania is another example.241
The Tanzanian government has undertaken to ensure that
investors conduct business in the least costly manner.242 The
objective of this project is “to strengthen the institutional and
239 See Minneh Kane et al., Sierra Leone-Legal and Judicial Sector Assistance 30
(The World Bank, Working Paper No. 32146, 2004), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP
/IB/2005/04/27/000090341_20050427151735/Rendered/PDF/321460SL0Legal01
0judicial0assessment.pdf (“There is virtual unanimity among Sierra Leoneans that
building confidence in the justice sector is an essential requirement of economic
investment and growth, and hence for reviving opportunities for economic
progress for Sierra Leoneans generally.”).
240 See JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA 1998-2003, supra note 230, at 29 (discussing
how the role of the judiciary includes not only the protection of human rights, but
also in the intervention in a vast number of everyday economic disputes so that a
society’s economy can flourish).
241 LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUD.
REFORM 83-84 (7th ed. 2004).
242 Id.
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organizational infrastructure of the new open market economy in
Tanzania that ha[s] emerged since the mid-1980s under the
[government’s] Economic Recovery Program.”243
The legal
component of the project has two parts: (a) building capacity in
key organizations such as the Judiciary and the Attorney General’s
Office by providing training, equipment and resources, and (b)
undertaking a systematic policy review of the key strategic issues
facing the financial sector over the medium and long-term.244
Kenya’s Justice and Integrity Project is another such effort.245 A
new government came into power in Kenya in January 2003 that is
committed to curbing corruption and developing a reform strategy
that will provide a justice system that is recognized to be a key
prerequisite for economic growth. The Justice and Integrity
Project’s objective is “to improve the administration of justice and
enhance the accountability, predictability, integrity and fairness of
the Judiciary and other institutions in the Justice Sector in
Kenya.”246 There are seven main components to the proposed
project.
The first involves reforming the court system by
introducing simplified proceedings, improving performance
standards for judicial staff, designing automated recordings of
court proceedings, enhancing case management, and introducing
computerized registry document management. The remaining
components entail:
[D]eveloping a comprehensive judicial training program;
[]trengthening the capacity of the [Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs]; [] developing a comprehensive legal
education and training program for lawyers and paralegals,
including establishing a College of Law; [] improving
access to justice through a capacity building program to
support the Office of the Public Defender and legal aid
offices ; []designing a program of law reform to support the
Government’s strategic plan and the new Constitution; and;
[] initiating a five year campaign to reduce corruption in
Kenya.247

Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 83
245 Id. at 20.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 20-21.
243
244
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While the foregoing examples of reform initiatives are
laudable, 248 especially to the extent they aim to make the judiciary
fairer, independent, and transparent, they are biased in favor of
safeguarding the interests of investors. The rights and issues
affecting the poor and the working classes are only relevant to the
extent that they are consistent with the interests of investors.
5.4. Anti-Corruption and Judicial Reform Initiatives Largely Ignore the
Poor.
The judicial reform and anti-corruption projects initiated by the
World Bank and governments examined in Section 3 mainly focus
on facilitating market transactions but ignore promoting good
governance to alleviate poverty.249 Thus, they do not target issues
of immediate concern for the poor such as when those in power
However, the lack of an
take public and private land.250
independent judiciary is also likely to aggregate inequalities and
worsen poverty. Where judiciaries and administrative agencies are
not insulated from the political process, they are more responsive
to the interests of investors, and income inequalities are likely to be
aggravated. After all, independent judiciaries are critical to
enforcing the rights of poor and marginalized peoples.
The poor and marginalized groups are also faced with multiple
obstacles to access legal and judicial services. The denial of fair
trial, due process violations, pre-trial detention, intolerable prison
conditions are just a few obstacles these groups face.251 In Kenya,
for instance, Amnesty International has raised serious concerns
about the right to a fair trial.252 There is a dearth of legal services
available in Magistrate Courts, especially for indigent defendants
charged with robbery or attempted robbery with violence that face
a mandatory death sentence if convicted. Additionally, since legal
248 Developing a comprehensive judicial training program has been an issue
in Kenya in the past, as the requirements for appointment as a Judge are “bare
minimum.” This means that there is no emphasis on academic qualification, and
a specific amount of work experience is not required for someone as long as he
has been a judge in a court in Kenya in the past. See JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA
1998-2003, supra note 230, at 57–100.
249 See supra Section 3.
250 Id.
251 LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUD.
REFORM 43–44 (5th ed. 2002).
252 Amnesty Int’l, Kenya, Violations of Human Rights: Communications Between
Amnesty Int’l and the Gov’t of Kenya, AI Index AFR 32/27/97, Sept. 1997
[hereinafter Kenya: Violation of Human Rights].
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proceedings are conducted in English, defendants who are not
conversant in English are unable to fully follow the proceedings.
This problem is particularly acute in cases involving Kenyan
Somalis in the Eastern Province.
Lack of interpretation
contravenes Kenya’s Constitution which provides that everyone is
entitled to have the free assistance of an interpreter paid by the
state if they cannot understand the language used at trial. The lack
of language assistance is particularly troubling because, due to
congressional legislation, convictions based on confessions are only
valid if made to a magistrate in open court.253
Prison conditions in Kenya also affect the poor
disproportionately. The conditions are harsh, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading.254
The circumstances include over-crowding and
shortages of food, clean water and adequate medical care. The
result is high prison mortality rates. It is estimated that in 1995,
more than 800 inmates died in the first nine months. Seventy-five
percent of the inmates were young and included single mothers
with children. The conditions in Kenyan prisons even prompted
then-President Moi to say “the belief is that any prisoner who
comes out of the prison alive must be lucky.”255 After visiting
Lang’ata Women’s Prison, a representative from a human rights
organization described the conditions there:
The prison blocs are congested, each cell holds three and
more people who share a small, torn mattress and tattered,
old blankets which they use to wrap themselves . . . .
[Prisoners] are not allowed to wear shoes or slippers
neither are they provided with anything to cover their feet
and thus they walk barefooted. Walking barefooted on this
filthy ground not only harms their feet but also makes them
sick with feet diseases and constant colds.256
The length of pre-trial detention is often beyond the legal limit,
and detainees are held for periods that exceed the maximum
period permitted by law. Police have sought to justify unlawfully
prolonged detention on the grounds that it is necessary to enable
253 See Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No 5 (2003), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT NO. 64 § 99.
254 Kenya: Violation of Human Rights, supra note 252. See generally Kenya’s
Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 7.
255 Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 12.
256 Kenya: Violation of Human Rights, supra note 252, at 22 (emphasis omitted).
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them to carry out their investigations. Courts rarely challenge
extended incarceration prior to trial. Habeas corpus actions are
costly and open only to those who can afford a lawyer.257
Inadequate time and facilities for trial preparation are problems
faced particularly by indigent defendants. When criminal cases
come to trial, prosecuting authorities usually provide little or no
advance disclosure of the prosecution’s evidence or which
witnesses will testify at trial. The defense is usually shown the
original hand-written statement of the witness at trial only in time
for use in cross-examination. The defense cannot retain or
photocopy the statement, making it difficult to challenge the
witness’ testimony. To compound these problems, the official
court records of the trial proceedings are often inaccurate, and
copies of such record are usually not available until 18 months
after the termination of the proceeding, rendering appeals almost
impossible.258
The judiciary may be reluctant to review the conduct of highplaced government officials when such conduct is inimical to the
interests of poor and marginalized citizens. For instance, a corrupt
minister leased substantial portions of an indigenous population’s
territory to a private company interested in exploring for oil. The
population had lived, hunted, trapped and fished in the territory
since time immemorial. The right of the group not to be deprived
of their means of subsistence was substantially affected yet Kenyan
courts declined to intervene on the group’s behalf.259 The Kenyan
judiciary has also shown reluctance in issuing injunctions when the
government failed to take adequate steps to protect a community
from radioactive exposure.260 There are also frequent reports of
large-scale evictions and demolitions of informal settlements in
many Africa cities including one most recently in Zimbabwe.
Often the pavement and slum dwellers are evicted to enable a
private entrepreneur to construct a shopping complex in the
vicinity, thereby depriving poor people who had migrated to the
city in search of employment of their informal settlement.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
259 Nihal Janyawickrama, Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights?, 9 E. EUR.
HUM. RTS. REV. 127, 135 (2003) (noting hypothetical examples based on actual case
law or reported events in Kenya).
260 Id.
257
258
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Uganda’s first National Integrity Survey, conducted by the
Inspectorate of Government, also highlights judicial corruption.
The survey found that bribery is most common with police and
judiciary services, where two-thirds of users pay bribes to the
workers in the police department and half the users pay bribes to
workers in the judiciary services.261 Kenya’s police and traffic
officers are notoriously corrupt as well. It has been estimated that
the traffic cops in Nairobi receive three million Kenyan Shillings
every day in bribes from people trying to avoid arrest or detention
for small or even nonexistent traffic infractions.262 About half the
service workers interviewed think that gifts from private
companies to public sector employees are acceptable, and nearly
half think that people reporting corruption are likely to suffer for
it.263
5.5. Conclusion.
Anti-corruption and judicial reform initiatives impact the poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged in African countries.
The
initiatives are primarily aimed at making it easier for investors to
do business rather than addressing the problems of corruption,
lack of judicial independence, and inadequate trial-preparation
resources that face the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged.
As a result, reforms to address corruption and judicial
enforcement of contracts should be complemented by
simultaneous efforts to address the problems confronted by the
poor and the disadvantaged. In the 1980s, good governance
reforms sought to address issues affecting the poor separately
under the rubric of social safety nets. Since the late 1990s, second
generation good governance reforms, such as the anti-corruption
and judicial initiatives, have been justified as attacking poverty by
promoting market reforms that would in turn promote economic
growth.
Under this conception, issues facing the poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged are indirectly, but positively,
supported by judicial and anti-corruption reforms to the extent
that increased investment results in more employment for them.
261 CIET INTERNATIONAL, UGANDA NATIONAL INTEGRITY SURVEY 1998: FINAL
REPORT ii (1998), available at http://ciet.org/en/documents/projects.library.ducs
/2006223144324.pdf.
262 Gakiha Weru, Extortion Gangs in Traffic Police Uniform, SUNDAY DAILY
NATION (Nairobi), Aug. 5, 2007, at 4.
263 Id.
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However, even assuming that anti-corruption and judicial reforms
do actually achieve their objectives, these reforms can hardly
guarantee increased investment. Infrastructure spending on roads,
hospitals and schools are critical to providing the kind of social
capital necessary to meet the basic needs of those living in poverty
while helping private investors to focus on managing services, as
recent research now definitively shows.264
By reframing issues related to social division and hierarchy in
market terms, anti-corruption and judicial reforms foreclose
addressing questions of inequality and injustice directly through
social spending. Inequality and injustice are central to social
disadvantage, poverty and economic marginalization and are not
simply the function of regulatory and market failure. Issues of
inequality and injustice were traditionally thought of as
addressable through public spending rather than through the
trickle down effects of private investment. As a consequence, a
fundamental problem with the current approaches to addressing
the broad array of challenges posed by poverty is that the current
programs of economic reform are disempowering to, and discredit,
such public spending. Ultimately, the interests of the poor and
marginalized can best be addressed as a central part of a reform
agenda that includes sensible anti-corruption and judicial reforms.
It would seem to me that these issues are too important to be left to
official development programs. Those who care about suffering
must take the bull by its horns and struggle with these issues.265
In practical terms, the model of judicial reform pursued by the
Asian Development Bank can be thought of as a counterpoint to
judicial reform programs that have not shown sensitivity to the
concerns of the poor.
Unlike the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank promotes judicial reforms that are designed not
only to attract foreign investment but to create employment for the
264 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, ENHANCING
ACCESS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 60 (2004), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files
/reports/44/123_report_en.pdf (outlining the fundamental role government
plays in “underwriting” investment in social structures as services cannot be
adequately funded by private actors); Ravi Kanbur & Nora Lustig, Why is
Inequality Back on the Agenda (Cornell University Department of Agricultural,
Resource, and Managerial Economics, Working Paper No. 99–14, 1999).
265 See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 7, at 390–93 (noting the
significant shift in the Indian Judicial system’s effectiveness is a result of judicial
populism); See also MARIO GOMEZ, IN THE PUB. INT.: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION AND PARTICIPATORY JUSTICE (1993) (highlighting the use of public
interest litigation to reach social political change).
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poor as well. By consciously pursuing the goal of increasing social
access to public goods and services, the Asian Development’s
model of judicial reform could serve as a framework for other
reform programs that bracket out issues of justice within them or
assume that increased foreign investment will ultimately reach the
poor. Ensuring that legal and judicial reforms also benefit the poor
would require lending institutions to work with civil society
groups committed to ensuring reforms also serves to strengthen
the administrative justice system in ways that benefit the poor and
marginalized. Example reforms could include ideas aimed at
implementing a property rights regime that helps the poor to
secure good title to land and understand judicial proceedings in
their own language.
6.

CONCLUSIONS: HOW TO REFORM ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES
TO ADDRESS POVERTY AND SOCIAL DIVISION
6.1. Overview of Findings

The relationship between corruption and human rights is only
beginning to be seriously examined. Ongoing research argues that
corruption disables a State from meeting its obligations to respect,
fulfill, and protect the human rights of its citizens.
This study has explored two other relationships between
human rights and corruption.
First, it has shown how
individualistic and procedural rights have been used to defeat
investigations and prosecutions of corruption by high-level
governmental officials. Second, it has demonstrated how anticorruption reforms have primarily targeted the promotion of
market efficiency while reducing spending for basic needs such as
health and education to the detriment of the social and economic
rights of the poor and marginalized. These findings are significant
because they show that the relationship between corruption and
human rights is more complex than simply that corruption
disables States from meeting their human rights obligations.
Indeed, human rights initiatives can be used in support of or
against corruption.
The thrust of the recommendations made in this study are
premised on an approach to human rights that offers the
maximum potential for the democratization of the Kenyan State
through transformative constitutional and institutional reforms.
This can be done by expanding human rights concerns to include
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the social and economic rights of the poor and institutional
safeguards for minority rights.
6.2. In the Context of Human Rights in Relation to the AntiCorruption Agenda.
It would be naïve to simply assume that a revamped Bill of
Rights would, by itself, result in more vigorous prosecutions
against corruption. Effective human rights agendas designed to
combat corruption should be part of a larger project to democratize
the State by reducing the powers of the presidency in relation to
the legislature, the judiciary, and civil society. Potential projects
should also incorporate reforms that would: (1) guarantee a truly
independent and impartial judiciary that is a human rights
watchdog for all Kenyan citizens; (2) create a Bill of Rights that
guarantees civil, political, social, and economic rights; and (3)
protect the rights of children, women, minorities, and the disabled.
Further, such projects would require a fair land policy that is free
of corruption and makes land available to all. This short list of
constitutional reforms would begin the long road of truly
democratizing the Kenyan State and would be an antidote to the
contemporary efforts and jurisprudence that largely contribute to
corruption.
Other reforms here would include the amending libel laws as
well as decentralizing the authority of the Attorney General to
prosecute and of the Commissioner of Police to investigate. This
reform is discussed further in the proceeding proposal for an
Office of Special Counsel.
6.3. In the Context of Judicial Reforms as They Relate to the AntiCorruption Agenda.
Earlier in this Article, we saw that anti-corruption and judicial
reform initiatives have an adverse impact on the poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged. Anti-corruption and judicial
reforms are primarily aimed at making it easier for investors to do
business and are not designed to address the problems of
corruption, lack of judicial independence and resources to prepare
for trial, and lengthy pretrial detention periods faced by the poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged.
In practical terms, the model of judicial reform pursued by the
Asian Development Bank can be thought of as a counterpoint to
judicial reform programs that have not shown sensitivity to the
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concerns of the poor.
Unlike the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank has sought to promote judicial reforms that are
designed not simply to attract foreign investment but to create
employment for the poor as well. By consciously pursuing the
goal of increasing social access to public goods and services, the
Asian Development’s model of judicial reform could very well
inform other reform programs that bracket out issues of justice
within them or that presuppose that increased foreign investment
will ultimately reach the poor. Ensuring that legal and judicial
reforms also benefit the poor would require lending institutions to
work with civil society groups that are committed to ensuring that
these reforms also serve to strengthen the systems of
administrative justice in ways that benefit the poor and
marginalized. Examples here could include reforms aimed at
implementing property rights regime that would help the poor
secure good title to land understood judicial proceedings in their
own languages.
6.4. Office of Special Counsel
I propose the establishment of an independent investigatory
and prosecutorial office for grand corruption. An Office of Special
Counsel would be constitutionally created and have the security of
tenure. It would be empowered to investigate and prosecute
grand corruption among members of the cabinet and other high
level officers of government.
The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission can continue to
investigate and prosecute all other cases of corruption. That would
free the Attorney General to prosecute and independently
investigate all other categories of corruption cases particularly
those that directly affect ordinary Kenyans, including those
involving the Local Authority Transfer Fund as well as the
Constituency Development Fund. These Funds are intended to
have a direct and local impact on the lives of people throughout
the country but they have not received nearly the kind of scrutiny
for corruption that is warranted.
In addition, Kenya could establish an independent anticorruption body similar to the ICAC, which was—and continues to
be—very effective in Hong Kong.266
An independent anti266 C. Raj Kumar, Corruption, Development and Good Governance: Challenges for
Promoting Access to Justice in Asia, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 477, 484–85 (2008)
(highlighting the establishment of the Independent Commission Against
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corruption body has proven to be more effective in combating
corruption for several reasons.267 First, being independent from
governmental interference allows it to pursue anti-corruption
matters faster and more efficiently without bureaucratic
interference.268 Additionally, it is likely that an independent
commission will be more effective in dealing with corruption
because it is less likely to contain members of the corrupt
government. Finally, in Kenya, a country where corruption has
become nearly ubiquitous, an independent corruption agency will
help to restore the Kenyan people’s faith in their government and a
desire to truly fight corruption.269 Further, an independent agency
will give people more faith in its anti-corruption programs270
because they will know that it is not a part of the Kenyan
government, which has been corrupt since its inception.
6.5. Parliamentary Control of Public Finance
Although Parliament has a constitutional duty to oversee the
government’s budgetary proposals on taxation and expenditure,
the thirteenth Parliament (2003-2007), like many before it, rarely
debated or scrutinized budget proposals for an overwhelming
In effect, government
number of government ministries.271
ministries spent their budgets with little or no oversight by
Parliament. This included over 38.4 billion Kenyan Shillings
allocated to the Ministry of Finance and over 19 billion to the
Ministry of Defense. It is primarily from these two ministries that
billions were paid to phantom companies in the Anglo-Leasing
and related scandals of the Kibaki government. The Watchdog
committees of the House, the Public Investments, and Public
Accounts Committee also failed to vigorously exercise their
oversight functions272 giving ministries a free hand to spend
Corruption to address the problem of corruption of the Anti–corruption Office o-f
the Police).
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 485–86.
270 Id.
271 MARS GROUP KENYA, THE CASE AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF THE 9TH
PARLIAMENT: A CRITIQUE OF THE 9TH PARLIAMENT OF KENYA 2003–2007 (2007),
available
at
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/publications/pubs/9th
_parliament1.pdf.
272 See id. at 19 (stating that not only have they failed to vigorously oversee the
spending, but they have fallen behind schedule by at least four years making any
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without accountability. Parliament must therefore assert its
traditional role of assuring effective oversight over government
expenditure.273
6.6. Individuals with Integrity
It is often argued that discretion in the hands of bureaucrats
creates room for corrupt behavior. While there is a truism in this
logic, the reverse is not true—that clear and unambiguous rules
create less room for corrupt behavior. Building institutions with
integrity requires having individuals with integrity.274 The case of
former Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics
demonstrates that there are Kenyans with integrity willing and
ready to serve in the government to end corruption. Integrity will
also be important not only within the anti-corruption institutions
engaged in observation, prevention, investigation, and
prosecution, but in the judiciary as well. As the Ringera report and
the subsequent purge of several judges demonstrated, the judiciary
has been rife with corruption.
6.7. Pre-Investment Screening of Sales of Public Assets
Parliament should pass a law requiring pre-investment
screening of all sales of public assets. This means that every time
public assets are up for sale, government officials responsible for
approving the sale would be duty bound to require bidders to fully
disclose their identities. Thus, if a foreign or locally incorporated
entity enters a bid for the disposal of public assets, its shareholders
(either natural persons or corporate entities) would have to be fully
disclosed prior to the execution of the sale. If shareholders are
businesses, the new law would at least require the full identity of
the chief executive officers of the parent company be fully
disclosed. A picture of such a person would not suffice for this
purpose. Instead, a valid passport or other government-issued

attempted check in the future futile since the evidence may be either lost, stale, or
destroyed).
273 Id.
274 This applies to the Judiciary as well, where Kenyan Chief Justice Chesoni
had been accused of gambling and of shouting government policy slogans when
drunk. These acts make the public wary of the Chief Justice’s judgments and
question the integrity of the Justices and therefore the system itself; See JUDICIAL
REFORM IN KENYA 1998-2003, supra note 230, at 69 (explaining the overall
prevalence of corruption in the judicial system amongst judges and the lack of
systemic change despite calls for change).
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document positively identifying such persons would be the only
acceptable proof of identity.
In addition, the certificate of incorporation of the entity as well
as the last two years worth of corporate returns in its country of
incorporation would be necessary. Furthermore, all government
officers approving the sale would have to sign off that they
satisfactorily ascertained the identities of any entity or person to
whom a sale of public property was made. Failure to comply with
such disclosure would be a punishable offense for officials
approving the sale. In fact, I would go even further and propose
that if such due diligence in positively identifying buyers of public
property is not made and a sale nevertheless proceeds, such failure
would make the contract void and unenforceable even if payment
had been made.275
7.

FINAL WORD

This study has extensively explored the relationship between
human rights and corruption. It has concluded with a series of
proposed reforms informed by this discussion. This study
achieves one important result: it shows that by categorizing the
anti-corruption agenda as a human rights issue, the
democratization of a country’s political, economic and social fabric
makes it more attentive and responsive to the rights of the most
marginalized segments of society. After all, corruption evidences
abuse of the public trust for private gain. Previously, the anticorruption agenda has been thought of almost exclusively in
economic terms; to the extent human rights and corruption have
been a focus, it has been to examine how corruption disables states
from meeting their human rights obligations. However, as this
study has demonstrated, rights have also been used to shield
powerful politicians from being investigated and prosecuted for
corruption. As such, a primary contention made in this study is
that the anti-corruption agenda is also a struggle in transforming
and democratizing a country’s social, political and economic life by
making it more attentive and responsive of the rights of the poorest
and most vulnerable. This study has begun the contextual analysis
of the relationship between corruption and human rights and has
shown the potential for further work in this area.
275 This proposal is based on my essay, James Gathii, Introduce Law to Screen
Public Asset Sales, BUS. DAILY (Nairobi), July 8, 2008, http://allafrica.com
/stories/200807090324.html.
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